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ABSTRACT 
 Cutting-edge technological innovations have enabled law enforcement agencies to 
collect data over a geographical area in relatively short amounts of time. Drones (also 
known as unmanned aerial vehicles) are becoming increasingly acceptable and employed 
by state and local law enforcement to become force multipliers. While the Federal 
Aviation Administration has addressed the integration and safety of flight requirements 
for law enforcement agencies to utilize drones, federal privacy and data collection 
regulations are unresolved. 
 This thesis argues that federal regulation is required and attempts to highlight the 
distinction between surveillance technology and delivery platforms to understand how to 
approach the regulation of data gathering. 
 In doing so, this thesis uses a political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
technological (PEST) analysis to examine Title III and relative jurisprudence dealing 
with both surveillance and aerial platforms. The PEST analysis aims to bring forward the 
salient points in crafting recommendations and expansion in current legislation that 
support an increase in citizens’ safety and security, but remain within the bounds of 
constitutional liberty and the Fourth Amendment. 
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A nation-state’s ability to access, control, and continuously monitor within its 
borders is paramount to ensuring its citizens’ safety and security. Cutting-edge 
technological innovations have enabled law enforcement agencies to collect intelligence 
over vast geographical areas in comparatively short amounts of time. However, how much 
is too much—surveillance, intelligence—or information? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of recent technological advances, how can state and local law enforcement 
agencies effectively employ drones to increase the safety and security of public spaces 
within the United States without infringing on the privacy of U.S. citizens?  
Should domestic law enforcement agencies expand to provide protection and 
intelligence collection through the use of drones (also known as unmanned aerial systems 
or vehicles, UAS or UAV) within U.S. borders?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Drones and sensing technology are useful now and are apt to become more useful 
(and widely used) because the technology keeps getting better. The term drone is associated 
with, and used synonymously with, the sensing and surveillance technology drones carry. 
Drones, however, are simply another aerial vehicle. Airplanes can legally fly over your 
home, and under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidelines, drones are no 
different, which is settled law. Fixating on drones in a sideways attempt to regulate 
surveillance provides strange results. 
Drone-based surveillance technology allows law enforcement to gather large 
volumes of data that can be useful in enforcing laws, rendering assistance, or providing an 
unbiased recall of contentious situations. The concern is that modern surveillance 
technology may infringe on privacy rights because its inherent capability to gather data 
transcends the standards enacted to protect privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The 
Fourth Amendment uses specific tests to determine whether privacy expectations are 
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reasonable and that the original intent and extent of privacy protection enacted when the 
Fourth Amendment was devised does not diminish over time or with technological 
advancement. 
Clearly, regulation will and does help manage this tension for maximum benefit on 
all sides. To regulate drone use for law enforcement, a distinction needs to be made 
between drone platforms and drone-borne surveillance technology. On the one hand, 
drones are simply aerial vehicles, fundamentally no different from other aerial vehicles that 
operate in the national air space (NAS). The FAA specifically regulates drones regarding 
all aspects of operation and licensing. On the other hand, the various perception and 
surveillance technologies carried aboard drones as “sensor suites” allow operators to 
survey the environment, perhaps from a distance, and gather data over the course of a flight, 
perhaps for safety or navigation purposes or perhaps for law-enforcement-related 
surveillance and data collection. Regulations regarding drone surveillance should rightfully 
focus on the surveillance aspect and be divorced from the UAV platform. 
More or less settled U.S. law holds that aerial search is reasonable because the 
search is conducted from public vantage points that anyone may reasonably see by looking 
with their eyes. Drones, as aerial platforms, work in these same public places. However, 
surveillance platforms have advanced through the use of other-than-visual sensors to allow 
technology to see through such opaque barriers as walls; these sensors can “see” more than 
the unaided human eye can. As such, they may conflict with the current legal framework 
for warrantless surveillance, which, as covered later in this thesis, remains pegged to the 
standard of human vision. 
The byproduct of effective collection is data. Advancements in data processing, 
storage, and dissemination—like sensor technology itself—have markedly increased in 
recent years. Data can be captured en masse in large-scale surveillance events and 
warehoused for review at a future date. Data review can be sped up or slowed down to 
analyze information at a depth not possible with live surveillance. Increases in storage 
capacity and the reduction in the cost of storage media have created a situation wherein the 
sheer volume of data being collected has outpaced the ability to analyze it. Where before 
large-scale data collection and storage was throttled by the physical limitation and financial 
3 
cost of storing it, now such storage solutions as cloud computing and streaming media, 
have largely removed collection and storage constraints. Digitization means data is no 
longer bound by a physical footprint, and as a result, more and more extraneous data is 
collected and stored. Due to the overcollection and hoarding of excessive data, commonly 
referred to as “infobesity,” analysts can become overwhelmed (“analysis paralysis”) by 
combing through a sea of data. It is a symptom of technology providing the ability to 
achieve a result without the throttling mechanism or regulation to curtail it. Data 
frameworks, for example, the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974, require that federal agencies 
comply with specific standards in their systems of records to maintain the privacy and 
accuracy of personal information stored in their databases. From that act came the Code of 
Fair Information practices that outlined general guidelines limiting the collection, 
disclosure, use, and security of the data federal agencies maintained on individuals.1 
However, personal information privacy protection guidelines in the Privacy Act of 1974 
are too general to curtail or adequately manage drone surveillance data effectively for use 
in law enforcement.  
Although surveillance in public spaces is legal, people are uncomfortable with the 
idea that they may be filmed by anyone at any time, particularly from a small agile aerial 
platform, without permission and without knowing who is doing the filming or for what 
the images will subsequently be used. A lack of transparency in law enforcement data 
collection and retention policies may increase concern in the community over mundane 
data gathering when no actual basis for the concern exists. Once data has been captured, 
an equally undefined access, storage, and retention policy might also breed concern that 
data might be used for purposes other than for which it was collected, and which might 
ultimately cause harm to the person at some future time. 
Jurisprudence has attempted to determine “reasonableness” of privacy expectations 
in cases of persistent surveillance, but it has not clearly defined what span of observation 
time constitutes a violation of privacy. If left ambiguous, this lack of specifics may lead to 
 
1 Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, Introduction to The Privacy Act (Arlington, VA: Defense 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, n.d.), 2, accessed November 18, 2020, https://dpcld.defense.gov/Portals/
49/Documents/Privacy/2011%20DPCLO_Intro_Privacy_Act.pdf. 
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issues when looking at extended drone data collection, either per collection event or over 
the course of multiple aggregated events. Drone-enabled collection inherently improves 
the ability of law enforcement to collect large amounts of high-definition data. What 
remains unresolved is what to do—or not to do—with the data once it is collected. 
C. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY AND SENSOR ACCURACY 
Advancements in technology mean that the rationale used as a basis for privacy 
cases, for example, the ready availability of technology for general public use, may be 
challenged as a constitutional standard. The first section provides the background on the 
advancements in technology and miniaturization that allowed increasingly sophisticated 
sensor suites to be placed on small drones. The second section discusses particular issues 
and shortcomings surrounding the accuracy and reliability of key sensor technologies 
central to today’s drone capabilities; namely facial recognition technology, the 
implications of subject misidentification for law enforcement missions and legal 
prosecutions, and how accuracy impacts the public’s perception on bias and usability in a 
law enforcement capacity moving forward.  
1. Advancing Technology 
The late 20th century saw an epochal shift from an age characterized by industry to 
one primarily fueled by technology and information. Moore’s Law, which predicted 
technological obsolescence based on the doubling rate of transistors on an integrated circuit 
board, and Kryder’s Law, which used disk drive density (areal density) improvement to 
predict future increases in storage capacity, both found that growth in the technology 
industry occurs exponentially.2 In similar terms, MAJ Michel Busch discusses UAS 
minimization trends in line with Moore’s Law from the first generation UAS design and 
capabilities, which were “determined, and limited, by the payload size and weight of the 
sensors available. During that time, the production of high-definition aerial imagery 
required a platform which today is called NATO class 2 UAS, weighing between 150 and 
 




600 kg and requiring dedicated launch and recovery elements.”3 Miniaturization, the 
fundamental enabler behind Moore’s law, has significantly changed today’s drone 
systems’ payload capacity and its ability to carry increasingly sophisticated sensor suites. 
The continued trend of increasingly miniaturized components has equipped today’s UAVs 
with extreme sensor precision and navigational accuracy at a fraction of the previous 
weight and size. High definition resolution, zoom, and low light image capture capability 
all surpass the ability of naked human perception. Pairing these sensor suites with drones 
for use by law enforcement creates ambiguity in current regulations in that drones can 
effectively see through barriers that human eyes cannot. 
Meanwhile, the commercial sector’s relentless drive to improve and market 
technology has precipitated a sharp rise in the development of small, inexpensive, and 
desirable technological gadgets; from fully integrated voice-activated smart devices to 
controlling fully networked homes to smartphones and personal visual surveillance devices 
no larger than a deck of cards, but with the capability to capture, track, and record 
everything in an individual’s immediate world. Today’s cheap and accessible nature of 
surveillance technology has placed it in the hands of the masses, including elements of 
society who seek to use these technological gains in illicit or illegal applications. Tech that 
was once only available to military units or specialized segments of society is now widely 
available and commonly employed. In this way, technology acts as a force multiplier, both 
for good and for malicious gain. More importantly, it undercuts the argument against 
allowing technology that can see through walls on the basis that it is not available for 
general public use, which thus calls into question the unconstitutionality of the equipment. 
2. Sensor Accuracy 
Law enforcement officers (LEOs) cannot be everywhere, but drones equipped with 
technology act as a force multiplier to enhance safety and security. At the center of the 
discussion on drone capability lies a deeper consideration for the accuracy of the sensors 
employed. Drones rely heavily on the use of sensors to offset the fact that they are not 
 
3 Michel Busch, “Unmanned Aerial Systems Miniaturization,” Joint Air Power Competence Centre 
(blog), March 22, 2018, https://www.japcc.org/unmanned-aerial-systems-miniaturization/. 
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physically manned. However, sensor accuracy and recognition algorithms designed for 
basic navigation purposes may not be discriminating enough to meet legal prosecution 
criteria. One such sensor of particular value to drone surveillance, but with a widely 
variable accuracy level, is facial recognition technology (FRT). 
FRT is one of the more politically charged emergent drone technologies deployed 
by law enforcement. Current facial recognition technology applications in use by law 
enforcement agencies (local, federal, and national) include public safety cameras, closed-
circuit television (CCTV), and satellite imagery to locate criminals. Software variants 
commonly used by enforcement agencies include detection algorithms, thermal analysis, 
and feature and texture analysis. Facial recognition benefits are increased significantly by 
the agility of drones. Numerous commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) drones currently employ 
one or more of these techniques.  
Applying innovative methods like FRT to apprehend dangerous individuals is vital 
to U.S. citizens’ security and protection. However, with the potential violation of civil 
liberties and privacy emerging as a hot issue, both lawmakers and law enforcement officials 
have articulated valid considerations. Law enforcement officials tend to focus on the 
necessity of implementing facial recognition software to locate, track, and apprehend 
criminals, while lawmakers tend to defend the privacy rights of American citizens. Both 
perspectives are critical in striking a balance between the desire for privacy and the need 
for effectiveness when employing these capabilities in the public arena. 
Additionally, the use of FRT in law enforcement is currently in contention. As Ted 
Rall, an American columnist and author, writes: 
Cops in a video command center tried to tap into Boston’s network of public 
and (mostly) private surveillance cameras to track the suspects in the 2013 
marathon bombing. However, the facial-recognition software system failed 
to pick up the Tsarnaev brothers as they moved across Boston and its 
suburbs because its algorithms required full-frontal images for 
comparison.4  
 
4 Ted Rall, “The Pros and Cons of Facial Recognition; Debate Safety and Civil Liberties before it 
Becomes Ubiquitous,” Wall Street Journal, May 2019, Proquest.  
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As Rall points out, this algorithm-constrained application of facial detection not only 
proved to be fruitless but also collected non-relevant data on the public lives of citizens. 
The collection of non-relevant data drives many privacy experts and activists to demand 
more restrictive legislation on this matter to protect Fourth Amendment rights. 
Since the technology used on commercially sourced drones comes largely from 
developments in private sector applications, private sector statistics are more applicable to 
the question of sensor and algorithm accuracy than a military-grade counterpart is. For this 
reason, law enforcement’s use of small drones draws from private sector discussions on 
technological development and algorithm accuracy. As an example, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) heavily criticizes the accuracy of facial recognition software, 
more specifically Rekognition, the software developed by online retailer Amazon. 
Although Rekognition is developed for the private sector, it is heavily sought-after by law 
enforcement agencies, and a prime candidate for drone-based law enforcement surveillance 
missions. In 2018, the ALCU ran a facial recognition accuracy assessment using 
Rekognition, and according to their study, “the software incorrectly matched 28 members 
of Congress, identifying them as other people who have been arrested for a crime.”5 While 
the implication that 28 members of Congress are criminals may be initially humorous, it 
sparked grave concerns about the validity of Amazon’s product and its use by law 
enforcement agencies. This imperfection highlights the inherent danger in relying solely 
on an algorithm for accurate identification. Drones enabled with facial recognition offer a 
world of new opportunity for law enforcement across the spectrum of missions, but the 
inherent danger of misidentification remains.  
Another concern that surfaced from this study and the rapidly evolving use of this 
technology is the potential bias against citizens with darker skin. According to the ACLU’s 
assessment, “nearly 40 percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of people 
of color.”6 The inaccuracy of modern-day facial recognition software and privacy concerns 
 
5 Jacob Snow, “Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with 




led some city legislators across America to enact policy changes prohibiting the use of 
facial recognition software by local law enforcement agencies. “Boston is now the second-
largest city in the world to ban facial recognition technology, behind San Francisco. Five 
other Massachusetts communities have a ban: Somerville, Brookline, Northampton, 
Springfield and Cambridge.”7 Much of the controversy that ignited these movements is 
due to the publicly held belief that recognition software infringes on the civil rights and 
liberties of American citizens.  
However, shortly after the ACLU assessment was published, Amazon debunked 
the findings based on the parameters used in the analysis. ACLU studies set the confidence 
threshold to 80 percent, a threshold well below the 99 percent standards used by law 
enforcement agencies. The confidence threshold, or percentage of accuracy, set can yield 
a vastly different data output. It is very unlikely that any judge in the United States would 
deem that the data gathered from a collection event with a confidence threshold set to 80 
percent was reasonable or reliable. Dr. Wood went on record with Amazon’s findings 
illustrating the importance of implementing strict settings to reduce any doubt when 
identifying individuals. 
The 80% confidence threshold used by the ACLU is far too low to ensure 
the accurate identification of individuals; we would expect to see false 
positives at this level of confidence. We recommend 99% for use cases 
where highly accurate face similarity matches are important (as indicated in 
our public documentation). To illustrate the impact of confidence threshold 
on false positives, we ran a test where we created a face collection using a 
dataset of over 850,000 faces commonly used in academia. We then used 
public photos of all members of U.S. Congress (the Senate and House) to 
search against this collection in a similar way to the ACLU blog. When we 
set the confidence threshold at 99% (as we recommend in our 
documentation), our misidentification rate dropped to zero despite the fact 
that we are comparing against a larger corpus of faces (30x larger than the 
ACLU test).8 
 
7 Ally Jarmanning, “Boston Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology. It’s the 2nd-Largest City to 
Do So,” WBUR News, updated June 24, 2020, https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/23/boston-facial-
recognition-ban. 
8 Matt Wood, “Thoughts on Machine Learning Accuracy,” AWS News (blog), July 27, 2018, 
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/thoughts-on-machine-learning-accuracy/?tag=theverge02-20. 
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Currently, the United States does not have a legal framework for LEOs to gather 
evidence using FRT on drones to prosecute persons of interest for potential crimes they 
may have committed. However, as an example of a successful model at work, the South 
Wales Police (SWP) recently settled a case, Bridges v. CCSWP, and SSHD, in the United 
Kingdom that addressed the employment of automated FRT (AFR). The Court addressed 
consent, civil liberties, and privacy rights infringement with the lens of the emergence of 
technological advances, for example placing technology on small mobile aerial platforms. 
They also acknowledged that with sufficient software criterion requirements and adequate 
safeguards in place to protect the data and privacy of biometric data, they were “satisfied 
both that the current legal regime is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary 
use of AFR Locate, and that SWP’s use to date of AFR Locate has been consistent with 
the requirements of the Human Rights Act, and the data protection legislation.”9  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The Fourth Amendment’s expectation of privacy only applies to the government 
snooping to find evidence to use against a person. A person has no more expectation of 
privacy vis-à-vis, say, Google, than what someone may find in the company’s formidable 
user’s agreement. Furthermore, the private sector owes no more consideration of a person’s 
privacy than what they pay for. The question at hand is whether the government can use a 
particular piece of evidence that it has pried out of a citizen’s hand or house or hand-held 
device against said citizen in a court of law. This same question applies to drone-based 
surveillance of the public. Before law enforcement can reasonably begin employing drones 
for law enforcement missions, unresolved questions surrounding the use of the technology 
and platform need to be addressed. The first section examines how jurisprudence regarding 
the reasonable expectation of privacy adapted to shifts in new technology and capability. 
The law enforcement’s position as to the necessity for drone surveillance to ensure safety 
and security is outlined. In counter, the position regarding concerns over privacy 
 
9 “High Court Dismisses Claim for Judicial Review in Facial Recognition Technology Case: Bridges 




infringement and Fourth Amendment are presented. The second section examines 
surveillance through aerial platforms’ lenses to establish the constitutionality of using 
aerial platforms to capture data and establish limitations on airspace ownership and 
exclusion. The third section explores data capture and use, including examining how the 
courts perceive the legality of using technology that can “see” through barriers, as drones 
currently can do. This section also examines jurisprudence surrounding persistent 
surveillance, and determining when the limit of the reasonableness of privacy expectations 
that separates surveillance from search is reached. 
1. Privacy: Reasonable Expectation  
The Fourth Amendment, often characterized as a “constitutional right to privacy,” 
provides the constitutional basis for “people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” without a legitimate warrant.10 
However, if incriminating objects are in plain view, then a warrant is not necessary. 
Nothing is more public than someone’s face. Following this line of reasoning, 
characterizing the collection of publicly displayed data (i.e., face) as unreasonable, citing 
Fourth Amendment protection rights, is paradoxical at best—akin to demanding “public 
privacy.”11 This section examines how jurisprudence regarding the reasonable expectation 
of privacy adapted to technology advancements and similarly advances to accommodate 
drone use profiles. 
The privacy granted under the Fourth Amendment is not absolute. Nor does this 
expectation prevail across all locations and circumstances. Olmstead v. United States 
(1927) acts as a baseline on Fourth Amendment precedent involving the emergence of 
technological advances.12 Justice Joseph Bradley emphasized, through the Court’s 
decision, that the majority was not concerned with how evidence was collected as long as 
 
10 “Fourth Amendment,” Legal Information Institute, accessed February 24, 2020, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment. 
11 Christopher Slobogin, “Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to 
Anonymity,” Mississippi Law Journal 72 (2002): 232, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.364600. 
12 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/
277/438. 
11 
it did not violate the sanctity of citizens’ homes or their Constitutional protections. 
Moreover, a lawful search and seizure referred “to the examination of one’s person, papers, 
tangible material effects, or home—not their conversations.”13 The penalty for the state 
violating a citizen’s Fourth Amendment privacy was exclusion of the would-be evidence 
from court; indeed, roughly 35 years later, the Exclusionary Rule expanded the expectation 
of privacy rights by deterring agents of the government from gathering and using evidence 
without cause (unreasonable search and seizure).14 A few years later, amid significant 
telephone technology changes, Katz v United States (1967) reversed the Supreme Court’s 
position in Olmstead. In Katz, a mobile recording device was planted by federal agents in 
the vicinity of a public telephone booth to monitor conversations about illegal gambling.15 
The defense for Charles Katz argued that using evidence obtained from mobile recording 
technology in a public area without penetrating a physical location was an unconstitutional 
search and seizure because an individual expects a meaningful level of privacy.16 In the 
decision, Justice Harlan affirmed that in an 
enclosed telephone booth, a person has a constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy; that electronic, as well as physical, 
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, and that the invasion of a constitutionally 
protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, 
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.17  
Katz clearly expanded an individual’s privacy rights beyond the home (Olmstead), along 
with establishing how evidence obtained through technology relates to electronic 
surveillance. By extending privacy to a public structure not owned by the individual being 
surveilled, this decision clarified that the public and private line for Fourth Amendment 
protections is not quite as clear-cut as persons, houses, papers, and effects in practice. 
 
13 “Olmstead v. United States,” Oyez, accessed December 3, 2020, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-
1940/277us438. 
14 “Exclusionary Rule,” Legal Information Institute, accessed November 11, 2020, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary_rule. 
15 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/
347. 
16 “Katz v. United States,” Oyez, accessed November 11, 2020, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35. 
17 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
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2. Privacy vs. Security: Two Cases 
Polarized opinions concerning privacy rights and civil liberties on one side march 
in strong counterpoint to law enforcement’s ability to capitalize on technology for the 
nation’s safety and security. The following two sections lay out the supporting viewpoint 
for using drones for law enforcement and opposing viewpoints from those who feel that 
drone use will infringe on privacy. 
a. The Case for Drone Collection, or Law Enforcement’s Position 
Testimony from Chief Vasque, of the Lawrence Police Department, indicates that 
drones are a proven force multiplier across the spectrum of law enforcement missions and 
are critical to ensuring U.S. citizens’ safety and security.18 A 2016 National Institute of 
Justice report highlighted that numerous examples of the successful employment of drones 
along the country’s border zones support those drones’ employment throughout the 
country’s interior poses little risk to privacy when clear limitations are imposed through 
regulation and appropriate-use guidelines.19 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies employ various types, models, 
and series UAS throughout the country. The Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Air and 
Marine Operations department operates a diverse fleet of vehicles ranging from Predator 
B drones to handheld units, and each has a specific mission based on its payload. The 
ability to maintain a “God’s eye” vantage point with drone-borne sensors allows the DHS 
and other agencies a distinct advantage that capitalizes on the capacity to collect data 
through sophisticated technology. Along with precise locations, patrolling agents are 
relayed time-critical intelligence information updates as situations escalate. These updates 
give agents a current situational report—a critical advantage in volatile situations—so they 
know what to expect once they arrive on-scene. Intelligence provided by drones gives the 
 
18 Jill Harmacinski, “Eyes in the Sky: Drones a ‘Force Multiplier’ for Lawrence Police Department,” 
The Eagle Tribune, October 17, 2020, https://www.eagletribune.com/news/merrimack_valley/eyes-in-the-
sky-drones-a-force-multiplier-for-lawrence-police-department/article_f128491f-a33f-5aaf-ac9c-
47743aa16ac2.html. 
19 Nancy Rodriguez et al., Considerations and Recommendations for Implementing an Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program, NCJ 250283 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2016), 102, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250283.pdf. 
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law enforcement agents involved a sense of domain awareness and allows them to prioritize 
their courses of action during dynamic or extended pursuits.20 Although on a smaller scale 
than the military-spec counterpart, flying COTS drone systems over volatile domestic 
situations provide state and local law enforcement personnel the same situational 
awareness, which enhances the team’s safety and effectiveness. 
UAS have a growing role in another kind of protection, search and rescue. The use 
of drones during search and rescue operations is a force multiplier in situations where 
human resources are inadequate, accessibility to the operating area and intelligence is 
limited, or when a natural disaster occurs. In 2018, experienced first responder UAV 
operators worked with the DHS to provide feedback on drones’ employment in the field. 
The drone focus group indicated, “small drones offer tremendous potential for emergency 
response missions. Thanks to recent [technological] advances, they have become more 
effective, more affordable, and easier to fly. They can not only keep responders safer but 
also provide opportunities for missions impossible for manned aircraft, such as exploring 
inside buildings and tunnels.”21  
b. The Case against Drone Collection, or the Privacy Position 
While the use of multi-sensor and highly capable drones for intelligence gathering 
and establishing communications networks are appealing for law enforcement and first 
responders, privacy concerns have been raised over the sensors UAVs may carry when 
employed by the U.S. government in citizens’ backyards instead of on the soil of a foreign 
battleground or nation-state. FRT, thermal imagery, and other high-tech, adaptive sensors 
capture not only targeted information but also secondary data involving individuals not a 
part of the investigation. The ACLU and other civil rights organizations heavily criticize 
 
20 “Eagle Pass CBP Officers Seize over $300K of Narcotics at Port,” U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, January 23, 2017, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/eagle-pass-cbp-officers-
seize-over-300k-narcotics-port. 
21 “Snapshot: First Responders Assess Drones for Search and Rescue Missions,” Department of 
Homeland Security, April 2, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/02/
snapshot-first-responders-assess-drones-search-and-rescue-missions. 
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facial recognition software and surveillance conducted on American citizens.22 
Specifically, the ACLU maintains a firm stance that the deployment of drones 
without proper regulation, drones equipped with facial recognition 
software, infrared technology, and speakers capable of monitoring personal 
conversations would cause unprecedented invasions of our privacy rights. 
Interconnected drones could enable mass tracking of vehicles and people in 
wide areas. Tiny drones could go completely unnoticed while peering into 
the window of a home or place of worship.23  
Agencies outside of the DHS’s realm (Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), other states, and local law enforcement agencies) have 
contracted for the employment of DHS drones to gather intelligence data. A very recent 
example is the deployment of an “unmanned [CBP] aircraft to help provide situational 
awareness for federal law enforcement partners in Minneapolis” during the George Floyd 
protests.24 The agency that requested the surveillance support was not identified, and the 
CBP promptly recalled its UAV to its home base in North Dakota. The ACLU’s position 
is that flying military-grade drones over domestic political protests is an overstep by an 
agency federally funded to operate surveillance on the border, as authorized by Congress.25 
However, no clear federal legislation restricts the overflight of drones over peaceful 
protests in a law enforcement capacity. This ambiguity calls into sharp focus the question 
of how legislators who sit on oversight committees can ensure Fourth Amendment rights 
are upheld during homeland surveillance. The ACLU’s privacy and technology department 
indicated:  
The public outcry has made it clear that if law enforcement is to benefit 
from sUAS use, they must involve the community in the process, being 
 
22 Jacob Snow, “Amazon’s Disturbing Plan to Add Face Surveillance to Your Front Door,” American 
Civil Liberties Union, December 12, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/amazons-disturbing-plan-add-face-surveillance-your. 
23 “Domestic Drones,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed June 5, 2020, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones. 
24 Geneva Sands, “Customs and Border Protection Drone Flew over Minneapolis to Provide Live 
Video to Law Enforcement,” CNN, May 29, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/cbp-drone-
minneapolis/index.html. 
25 Jay Stanley, “Protests, Aerial Surveillance, and Police Defunding,” American Civil Liberties Union, 
June 24, 2020, https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/protests-aerial-surveillance-and-police-
defunding/. 
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transparent on the benefits and risks and on the safeguards that will be put 
in place to protect public privacy and safety. Strong community 
relationships and communication can ensure that sUAS become community 
assets used to solve community problems.26  
UAS are currently regulated to ensure safe operation in the NAS but are not governed by 
similar regulations regarding acceptable use for surveillance. Therefore, before adopting 
UAS for law enforcement purposes, a consensus on regulation is needed to prevent privacy 
infringement and data mismanagement.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes two different approaches to solving the problem: (1) regulating 
technology (collection) prior to a surveillance event by amending the existing federal 
statute, and (2) regulating data collection and use after it has been collected, regardless of 
the means used. The findings of the analyses were subsequently evaluated against three 
criteria to determine success: (1) what constitutes an effective employment of drones, (2) 
how to measure the safety and security of public spaces, and (3) how to determine 
subsequent improvement in safety and security associated with the use of drones  
Specifically, this thesis entails a policy options analysis that uses the PEST 
(political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological) analysis framework, a strategic tool 
originally developed to help businesses succeed by understanding “big picture” impacts in 
the form of opportunities and threats beyond the control of the business. The PEST analysis 
framework (Appendix A) examined macro-environmental factors using environmental 
scanning to identify opportunities and threats in the external environment to understand 
factors better that affect the organization and generate policy recommendations. The PEST 
analysis identified gaps, seams, and areas for change necessary to recommend the best 
policy option for the safe, effective employment of drones while respecting legitimate 
privacy concerns. The following concerns are underlying core concerns (gaps) recognized 
 
26 Maria Valdovinos, James Specht, and Jennifer Zeunik, Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2016), 2, https://rems.ed.gov/docs/COPS_Community-Policing-UAS.pdf. 
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by community experts and privacy advocates to enable a way forward in developing federal 
and state legislation, as well as policy options.27 
∑ Concern 1: No consistent guidelines and limitations exist to control or 
regulate visual surveillance in the United States. 
∑ Concern 2: No core consensus exists among state regulations that provide 
guidelines for the employment of visual surveillance in public, nor does a 
consensus on penalties for violations. 
∑ Concern 3: No policy or legislative framework exist governing data 
retention, access, archive, and deletion in conjunction with law 
enforcement UAS surveillance data collection. 
∑ Concern 4: No sufficient jurisprudence exists to steer the operation of 
UAS clearly for law enforcement purposes in light of new technological 
capabilities that enhance observation beyond “naked-eye aerial 
observation.”28 
∑ Concern 5: A consensual intercept framework needs to be established to 
authorize law enforcement to continue recording in constitutionally 
protected arenas in cases of contested authorization, for example, in 
situations of domestic abuse or when anyone but not all involved parties 
have authorized surveillance. 
Using PEST, data was sorted into four categories, and an analysis was performed 
to determine the feasibility of implementing each solution from the standpoints of political 
 
27 “Big Data,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed November 23, 2020, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/big-data; Stanley, “Protests, Aerial Surveillance, and 
Police Defunding”; Gregory McNeal, “Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislatures,” 
Brookings (blog), November 13, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/research/drones-and-aerial-surveillance-
considerations-for-legislatures/; National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Voluntary 
Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability Consensus, Stakeholder-Drafted Best 
Practices Created in the NTIA-Convened Multistakeholder Process (Washington, DC: National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2016), 3, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
publications/uas_privacy_best_practices_6-21-16.pdf. 
28 “California v. Ciraolo,” Oyez, accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1513. 
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practicality, economic viability, the socio-cultural likelihood of acceptance, and 
technological feasibility. PEST analysis also yielded stakeholder preference for the five 
key players: public, law enforcement, ACLU, government, and business. The scope of this 
study accepts five key assumptions when examining the feasibility of the solution: 
∑ Privacy expectations continue to remain at currently reduced levels or 
have further declined with the mass public acceptance of widely available 
advanced technological devices. 
∑ No established federal limits are placed on visual surveillance of public 
spaces, excepting such spaces considered public-private as restrooms and 
changing areas. 
∑ All spaces with public access will be treated as public space, with no 
reasonable expectation of privacy during the time the public is reasonably 
expected to have access to that particular area.  
∑ In any case where it is in the best interest to the safety of law enforcement 
personnel or other citizens, visual surveillance methods that provide live 
visual feedback without data capture are authorized for use, to include 
easements and in transit. 
∑ Visual surveillance enhanced by technological aids (drones, scopes, or 
sensors) is treated as the legal equivalent of in-person visual observation. 
Proposed metrics to demonstrate policy success after implementation include 
reductions in the number of use-of-force incidents and public complaints against LEOs, 
reductions in line-of-duty injuries and incident reports for LEOs, increased event 
recollection accuracy of police reporting using captured data to corroborate narratives and 
reduce reliance on memory under duress, improved police practices and response methods 
based on an after-incident review of the footage, a reduction in bias and an increase in the 
reliability of data used for prosecution as measured by a decrease in data procedurally 
excluded at trial, and a reduced trial burden as determined by an increase in the number of 
cases resolved by plea deals using drone-captured evidence. 
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Analyzing policy options through the lens of PEST provides the most relevant look 
at “trends and occurrences in an organization’s internal and external environment that bear 
on its success, currently and in the future. The results are extremely useful in shaping goals 
and strategies.”29 While primary research in the form of surveys may have the potential to 
yield a more accurate, tailored stakeholder preference response, the sample size required 
to achieve meaningful results would offset the slight increase in overall data accuracy over 
other secondary research methods. PEST provides a diverse look at the current attitude 
toward technology-driven surveillance and yields the most promising angle for developing 
a knowledge base for predicting acceptance and preference for drone-surveillance 
regulation in the future. As such, the outcome of the evaluation determined a solution that 
presents the best balance of regulation and oversight under the constraints of protecting 
privacy and maximizing technological capability.  
F. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis primarily focuses on technology, surveillance, and public acceptance 
centralized around the employment of drone-enhanced capability throughout the 
contiguous United States. Chapter I presents opposing perspectives; the case for and 
against the use of technology to increase surveillance capability on U.S. soil, and provides 
in-depth insight into technology’s public evolution within the context of the Fourth 
Amendment. Chapter II discusses modern-day surveillance and Title III through the lens 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Chapters III and IV present two optimized solutions 
for the regulation of drone-based technology and visual surveillance, and the control of 
data collected during drone surveillance. Finally, Chapter V presents a discussion and 
makes recommendations for establishing the best balance of regulation and oversight under 
the constraints of protecting privacy and maximizing technological capability as a 
framework for incorporating future innovations. 
 
29 “Conducting an Environmental Scan,” Fordham University, accessed November 4, 2020, 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/26625/conducting_an_environmental_scan#. 
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND GAPS 
This chapter covers a history of Title III surveillance, legal frameworks, aerial 
platforms, data capture, and gaps in the United States. During the discussion of Title III, 
this section covers what it set out to do, what it achieved, where it failed, and how it needs 
to adapt to remain relevant as technology continues to advance. This chapter also reviews 
aerial observation and data capture cases to illustrate tradeoffs of gaining capability and 
privacy. As it stands, Title III is an excellent baseline to expanding regulation to address 
finding a middle ground between preserving liberty and providing security. Existing 
regulation establishes why Title III came about, what it achieved, what it fails to do, and 
what it needs to address gaps when dealing with drone-borne technology. Consternation 
exists surrounding the use of technology to “observe” someone beyond the capability of 
the human physical limitation that stems from a fear of the “unknown.” Questions arise in 
the minds of the people being surveilled as to “what” and “why” someone captured data 
and “how” they intend to use that data moving forward. When the intent is known, many 
people willingly subject themselves to video capture and data use, as is the case of on-the-
scene interviews, reporting for news stories, or publicizing and promoting programs, for 
example school district media pages.  
A. TITLE III AND SURVEILLANCE 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is a 
comprehensive legislative scheme that plays at the heart of this discussion and balances the 
right to privacy against a bona fide need to gather the intelligence critical to countering 
criminal activity and enforcing the law.30 Title III governs most forms of electronic 
surveillance today, but it does not address either visual surveillance or penetrating 
surveillance like thermal- or sonar-based technology. Title III is well suited to expanding 
its framework to capture these and other sensors yet to be developed. Electronic technology 
 




provides an effective but also potentially highly intrusive tool for conducting surveillance. 
It is so effective, in fact, that regulations banning and then specifically reenabling intercept 
technology spawned from a series of legal decisions in the 1960s, led by Katz v. United 
States in 1967, when electronic communications of all sorts were becoming ubiquitous in 
the United States.31 In 1968, Congress advanced the first specific legal framework for 
electronic surveillance in the form of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act (Title III).32  
Title III prohibits aural, electronic surveillance and interception; it also exempts 
and strictly regulates specific deviations for law enforcement personnel subject to 
minimization and other established criteria. While this act served to restore law 
enforcement’s ability to intercept communications information, it quickly suffered from 
obsolescence itself in the face of technology industry growth. Even something as mundane 
as determining how to interpret the word “mobile,” as used in the mobile interception 
device referenced in 18 U.S.C 2518(3), can drastically change the interpretation of the 
legality of law enforcement’s actions conducting surveillance. The 7th circuit (United 
States v. Ramirez) interpreted the word “mobile” to mean something that would intercept 
“mobile” devices—for example cell phones—that by design, were not tied to a specific 
location.33 The 5th circuit, in a per curiam decision (United States v. North), took a 
different stance on the interpretation of “mobile intercept device,” and chose instead to 
focus on the mobility of the actual intercepting technology.34 This interpretation, generally 
associated with the oral listening device commonly referred to as a “bug,” also aligns with 
the style of collection characterized by the use of UAS. 
Title III was further amended in 1994 by the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA), which “requires telecommunications carriers to modify their 
equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are 
 
31 Oyez, “Katz v. United States.” 
32 “Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,” Justice Information 
Sharing, accessed October 20, 2020, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1284. 
33 United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997), https://casetext.com/case/us-v-ramirez-58. 
34 United States v. North (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-north-16. 
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able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions.”35 This modification made 
the wiretapping process easier for agencies to tap digital telephone lines and added 
language for email and internet service providers to assist in intercepting electronic 
communications. Title III was also amended by the Patriot Act (2015) to assist law 
enforcement in terror-related crimes. Both of these updates fall outside the scope of this 
discussion.36 
1. What It Set Out To Do 
Title III requires: 
Compliance with explicit directives that controlled the circumstances under 
which law enforcement’s use of electronic surveillance would be permitted. 
Many of the restrictions on the use of electronic surveillance by law 
enforcement agents were enacted in recognition of the strictures against 
unlawful searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution [and] several of Title III’s provisions are more 
restrictive than what is required by the Fourth Amendment.37  
Title III set out specific requirements for conducting wiretaps, and using reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause to establish a foundation to obtain a lawful warrant. It applies 
specifically to monitoring the content of communications intercepted over wire, and more 
specifically, telephone conversations. 
As amended in 1986 by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Title 
III defines three broad categories of communications under the umbrella of permissible 
surveillance based on their transmission media: spoken, wire, and electronic.38 Oral (voice) 
transmission encompasses the intercept of the spoken word during the propagation of 
sound through open air, as that captured by using a bug or other co-located listening device. 
 
35 Patricia Moloney Figliola, Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, CRS Report No. RL30677 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
CRS-1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30677.pdf. 
36 History com Editors, “Patriot Act,” History, December 19, 2017, https://www.history.com/topics/
21st-century/patriot-act. 
37 “9-7.000—Electronic Surveillance,” Department of Justice, February 19, 2015, 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-7000-electronic-surveillance. 
38 Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 
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Wire (voice) surveillance intercepts transmissions traveling through traditional wires, 
cables, or optical media. The third category, electronic, acts as a catchall for other forms 
of non-voice communications data transmitted digitally through media that falls outside 
the scope of oral or wire transmission. Though often classified as a surveillance tool in 
their own right, drone systems are fundamentally carriers of independent interception 
technologies. Drones, as a technology, are often the targets of misguided legislation whose 
actual purpose is to regulate surveillance technology. Drones are aerial platforms, and as 
such, are already regulated by the FAA. Separating drones and the sensor drones carry is 
an important distinction to make in the broader discussion of legality and the scope of their 
employment. 
2. What It Achieved 
To date, Title III has very adequately addressed privacy concerns for the technology 
it regulates by incorporating minimization techniques that limit how and when it is legal to 
infringe on a person’s right to privacy in private places. Surveillance technology is 
intrusive. Title III recognizes that intrusion and functions to prohibit both the interception 
and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications for all but a few very specific 
applications sanctioned by the statute, to include highly regulated use by law enforcement 
agencies.39 It restricts the use of communications surveillance to valid and vetted requests 
by law enforcement agencies who first must demonstrate that the request has been made 
based on probable cause and other criteria set forth by statutes and the constitution. It 
further establishes significant penalties for misuse, including fines, possible suppression of 
evidence, and disciplinary action against an investigative officer or LEO.  
In deference to Title III, the DOJ has codified electronic surveillance under title 
nine, chapter seven of the Justice Manual covering the 
specific mechanisms, including applicable approval requirements, for the 
use of wiretaps, ‘bugs’ (oral interception devices), roving taps, video 
surveillance, and the consensual monitoring of wire or oral 
 
39 “18 U.S. Code Chapter 119—Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of 
Oral Communications,” Legal Information Institute, accessed August 10, 2020, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-119. 
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communications, as well as emergency interception procedures and 
restrictions on the disclosure and evidentiary use of information obtained 
through electronic surveillance.40  
According to the DOJ, “Title III, by its definition of oral communications, permits 
Federal agents to engage in warrantless interceptions of oral communications when the 
communicating parties have no justifiable expectation of privacy.”41 In cases where 
consent is given or met, warrantless interception is allowed in situations that may generally 
require Title III authorization; specifically telephone, oral, or electronic communications.42  
Approval for surveillance is required in advance of the collection. The request must 
be submitted to the DOJ for review before being submitted to a court of competent 
jurisdiction for authorization. Applications are reviewed in a thorough process to ensure 
that rigorous standards are applied to each request to confirm that the surveillance is both 
valid and necessary and that other less intrusive means could not provide a similar result.  
Title III applications uniquely require an additional showing of necessity. 
The government’s application must provide a ‘full and complete statement’ 
describing all other investigative techniques that have been tried and failed 
or explaining why such techniques are likely to be unsuccessful or too 
dangerous—18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The court must determine that ‘normal 
investigative procedures’ have been or would be unsuccessful or 
excessively dangerous. Id. § 2518(3)(c).43  
Title III interception of wire and oral communications is further limited to only the specific 
crimes listed in 18 U.S.C § 2516(1).  
Upon completion of the Title III electronic surveillance, under 18 U.S.C 2518 
(8)(a): 
The recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication 
shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or 
other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, 
 
40 Department of Justice, “9-7.000—Electronic Surveillance.” 
41 Department of Justice. 
42 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/440/
741/. 
43 Timothy Crudo and Nicholas Lin, Wiretapping for Beginners (New York: Law360, 2011), 3, 
https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/wiretapping-basics. 
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or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge 
issuing such order and sealed under his directions.44  
Once sealed, the applications and contents are protected from tampering or alteration, and 
the privacy of persons not charged can be ensured using a Rule 16 protective order applied 
to “forbid public disclosure of the contents of the materials” coincidentally captured in the 
course of the authorized surveillance.45 
3. Where It Failed 
By 1986, to remain relevant to the technological conversation and continue to 
provide a reasonable compromise between the rights of individuals and law enforcement 
needs, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.46 Then, as now, it 
became eminently clear that the existing framework no longer adequately captured the 
technology capabilities of the day. As became evident in the time before Title III, the loss 
of surveillance capability by law enforcement is detrimental to mission success.  
When Title III was amended in 1986, the resulting legislation defined three broad 
categories of communications that could be intercepted.47 Those categories fundamentally 
translate into voice and data. According to the ACLU, visual surveillance, arguably one of 
the most invasive forms of collecting data on a target is one of the least-consistently 
regulated of the collection tools.48 Laws differ significantly from state to state, but 
generally, all adhere to the general provision of a “right to reasonable expectation of 
privacy” under the Fourth Amendment. Regulation varies greatly, from designating 
specific areas off-limits to surveillance, for example, bathrooms or changing rooms, to a 
requirement to notify customers and employees of the existence of cameras on a property, 
 
44 “18 U.S. Code § 2518—Procedure for Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications,” 
Legal Information Institute, accessed August 10, 2020, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2518. 
45 Department of Justice, “9-7.000—Electronic Surveillance.” 
46 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/
statutes/1285. 
47 Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 
48 “What’s Wrong with Public Video Surveillance?,” American Civil Liberties Union, March 2002, 
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to rights to privacy being wholly forfeited and void upon a posted notice advising the public 
that a video camera is in use.49 In cases where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
pursuant to DOJ order 985–82, the authority to review requests for law enforcement CCTV 
video surveillance purposes rests with specific officials of the DOJ Criminal Division 
under rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the All Writs Act.50  
Since video surveillance laws vary significantly from state to state, they offer 
almost arbitrary limitations on how and when an entity may conduct surveillance on the 
public at large. Unlike its counterparts in voice and data capture, video surveillance is not 
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2511.51 Fundamentally, just about anyone with a camera can 
point it into the public realm right now and capture just whatever they please without 
consequence. This “open-season” video capture mentality is especially true of service-
centric businesses and such venues as libraries, casinos, restaurants, theme parks, and 
public sports or recreation facilities. Patronage of these venues implies consent to be 
monitored while on or near the premises, whether the party being surveilled has actually 
consented or not.52 While the majority of data collected is likely never going to be used 
for the purpose it was initially collected, nothing is preventing its use or disclosure in any 
way, and for any means, the collector deems fit after the fact. The ubiquitous nature of 
video capture in society today suggests that a hard look at visual surveillance, and all its 
various aspects, is perhaps overdue. 
No clear, standing consensus has been reached when it comes to regulating video 
surveillance. Video surveillance is already established and pervasive throughout society. 
Video capture technology has been used by citizens to protect their homes (Ring Flying 
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Security Drone), de-escalate arguments (social media live feed), and monitor activities 
(Nest) for years. Smartphones are used to record video clips of everything from personal 
celebrations at restaurants to sporting events and beyond, often collaterally capturing 
countless unwitting spectators and employees in the process. It would be untenable to 
attempt to regulate or criminalize every inadvertent capture of third-party activity in the 
public arena. Furthermore, U.S. society is living in a time that has seen a generational shift 
in privacy mindset from “big brother” and “cold war secrecy” to “#Me Too.” The rising 
generation lives out of the shadows and has spurned movements of openness that have 
prompted all generations to expose data and behaviors historically made possible by an 
outdated “culture of shame” mentality. Society has similarly shifted its definition of 
privacy to accommodate video capture technology as an acceptable “norm.”53 In accepting 
public video surveillance as a “norm” for private citizens, society must also accept an 
equivalent level of access when agents in the enforcement of laws employ that technology.  
4. What Remains to be Fixed 
This discussion stipulates that the existing framework and constitutional rights 
under Title III are adequate for protecting privacy and sufficiently limited in scope to hold 
up under scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional framework for the 
surveillance methods it covers. However, to continue to be relevant to today’s 
conversation, Title III is due for an expansion. When Title III was originally conceived in 
1968, no one could have envisioned a future wherein technology could have advanced to 
the degree it has today. Now in the form of smartphones and networked information 
systems, the average person has access to tools with the ability to provide the combined 
accumulated knowledge of the human race at the touch of a button on a device the size of 
a human hand. These same tools and capabilities should not be withheld from law 
enforcement.  
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Without a clear framework, federal or otherwise, on visual surveillance in the 
public sector, it is difficult for law enforcement agencies to employ drones effectively in 
society to enhance safety and security, both for the public at large and for the officers 
themselves. Senators and Congressmen have attempted to establish privacy regulations, 
limitations, and transparency but have had little success.54 Much of this discussion plays 
out in the public arena at large, where inherent privacy or any right to such does not exist.  
B. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PLATFORMS VERSUS SENSORS  
The implementation of technology to conduct observation (surveillance) is overt. 
Most COTS drones are visible to the eye and audible on the ground at the ranges at which 
they are flown to observe and collect on targets. This observation is equivalent to equipping 
a uniformed officer with a body-mounted camera.55 High-altitude drone systems like those 
employed by the military and the DHS are out of sight and mind but still not technically 
covert observation tools. High altitude employment of UAS is less likely to be noticed by 
the public at large, and the cost of employment precludes this type of tool from becoming 
an everyday daily use system. Geopositioned surveillance falls outside the scope of this 
discussion.  
Under the ECPA amendment to Title III, roving interception is the authorization to 
surveil a specific person of interest without specifying a location where the interception 
will take place. It is generally sought and granted in cases when it is believed that the 
subject would take actions to thwart collection attempts specifically, and therefore, not 
practical to do so.  
In essence, the roving intercept provision provides that if federal 
investigators can show that specification of the particular place for 
interception of an oral communication is not practical, they may obtain an 
oral intercept order authorizing them to intercept all of their suspect’s face-
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to-face conversations relating to the crime under investigation, no matter 
where those conversations happen to occur.56  
The tradeoff in a roving intercept over a standard intercept is that to authorize the 
surveillance of a person of interest in a non-specific location, the subject must be 
specifically identified beforehand, rather than listed as “if known.” Drones are well suited 
to perform persistent roving surveillance, and the enabling technology will only continue 
to improve into the future. 
1. Aerial Observation and Public Vantage Point 
Among the critical issues with operating drones for surveillance is establishing the 
airspace from which drones can legally surveil the environment. Looking at drone 
surveillance through the lens of manned aerial surveillance is the most relevant path to 
establish the constitutionality of using unmanned aerial platforms to capture data and 
establish limitations on airspace ownership and exclusion easement and overflight. 
United States v. Causby (1946) served to establish an easement altitude over private 
property of 83 feet.57 Causby was a chicken farmer, and the low altitude overflight of his 
property by military aircraft during takeoff and landing from an adjacent field caused his 
chickens to commit suicide against the barn walls. Seeking compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment for the loss of his chickens, the minimum altitude of the lowest approach (83 
feet above ground level (AGL)), the Causby case became the standard for defining the 
column of airspace associated with the rights of a landowner.58 Causby’s findings held that 
“airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. 
We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights over private land 
are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate 
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interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.”59 Since drones are regulated to fly in 
the NAS, they are required to comply with traffic separation and operating altitudes. For 
drones under 55 pounds, the maximum allowable altitude is 400 feet above the ground with 
a maximum speed of 100 mph.60 No minimum speed is currently associated with small 
UAS. In practice, UAS pilots would be allowed to transit over private property at will en 
route to a destination. Piloted aircraft operate in visual flight rules (VFR) using a collision 
avoidance technique known as see and avoid, without specific legislation in the future 
directing it. Without a viable technological collision avoidance system in place, drones 
would also be operating with visual sensors on at all times. Since the most common route 
of transit for aircraft is direct-line to the destination, the likelihood of routine low-altitude 
overflight of private property in the normal course of operation is very high.  
Flyover surveillance is hardly controversial these days. In the late 1980s, the Santa 
Clara Police Department received an anonymous drug tip and investigated it. 
Unfortunately, the police could not “observe the contents of the respondent’s yard from 
ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing 
the yard.”61 The police department then used a private aircraft to fly over the suspected 
drug dealer’s home to observe his backyard. Using photographs obtained through aerial 
surveillance, the investigating officers collected the data required to obtain a warrant, make 
the arrest, and convict the perpetrator. The use of the aircraft was necessary to provide the 
officers with a vantage point they could not achieve from the street level. The offender’s 
motions to dismiss the evidence on the grounds of privacy and alleged Fourth Amendment 
violations were rejected due to the argument that “any member of the public flying in this 
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.”62 
While the California Court of Appeals ruled that the search was unreasonable:  
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections 
regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers 
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are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets 
or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was 
nonintrusive and took place within public navigable airspace, their actions 
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.63  
Ciraolo may have built the enclosures to keep his activities private, but his yard was not 
actually protected from all observation. Findings from California v. Ciraolo established 
that surveillance and observation conducted from a public vantage point that rendered 
activities clearly visible did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. 
In the same year as California v. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Company argued that the 
use of aerial photography by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the 
Dow’s Michigan facility on its 2000-acre property constituted a warrantless search, which 
violated the company’s Fourth Amendment rights. According to the 5–4 decision in Dow 
Chemical Company v. United States, “the fact that EPA could take aerial photographs of 
the facilities from public airspace with the standard photographic equipment employed by 
mapmakers confirmed that the area was not subject to strict protection from observation.”64 
The Court’s decision also highlighted that the employment of common-use technologies 
of the time were an acceptable means to gather evidence as long as they were reasonably 
accessible to the public.  
The Dow case, along with that of Ciraolo, laid the foundation for Florida v. Riley 
(1989), another case about officers who were able to discern the illegal cultivating of 
marijuana plants from an airborne vehicle; in this case, a rotorcraft. In Riley’s case, officers 
spotted the marijuana plants through openings in the roof and unenclosed sides of a 
greenhouse from the air in a helicopter flying 400 feet above ground level. Justice White 
used the findings from California v. Ciraolo to conclude “that a naked-eye police 
inspection of the backyard of a house from a fixed-wing aircraft at 1,000 feet” did not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and the conclusion that the “respondent 
could not reasonably have expected that the contents of his greenhouse were protected from 
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public or official inspection from the air, since he left the greenhouse’s sides and roof 
partially open” the court found that he did not have an expectation of privacy.65 Of note, 
Justice O’Connor concluded that the FAA safe operational altitude for a specific type of 
aircraft alone was not the deciding factor for Fourth Amendment constitutionality.66 
Instead, “consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public 
airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that 
Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not ‘one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.”67 
2. Data: Capture and Use 
Thermal imaging devices and other sensors that enhance visual observation beyond 
the capability of the human limitation are ubiquitous on drones. Further, drones are 
continuous collectors of data—from using GPS positioning to navigate to visual sensors to 
see and maneuver around terrain within the environment—a wealth of data is captured. 
Secondary use of data—data used for other than its original purpose—becomes contentious 
when it appears that it is being collected under pretext. 
In the case of Kyllo v. United States, emergent technology with thermal imaging 
capability was creatively employed by LEOs to determine if Danny Kyllo was growing 
illegal controlled substances in his home. The thermal imager could not distinguish the 
identity of objects through the walls of the home, nor could it detect physical movement. 
The use of this device compared the heat emanating from the home to the heat signatures 
of surrounding homes. The employment of this sensory-enhancing technology was found 
to be “not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment 
search, and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”68 Also, while the argument 
indicated that there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy, because the thermal device 
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did not illustrate intimate details, that “all details are intimate details.”69 This case 
highlights two areas of contention: as technology advances, it will undoubtedly surpass the 
limits of naked human ability and make its inherent operation able to know things 
“unknowable without physical intrusion” and a reliable mechanism or standard does not 
exist to determine what constitutes “general public use.” Today, many tools are not in 
general use because their utility is specific to specialized tradecraft. For example, full-body 
scanners are commonly employed for airport security but would not necessarily have a 
broad public use application across other disciplines. In the case of drone-integrated 
sensors, much like airport body scanners, the functionality would not have a vector for 
general public use, but would be employed to enhance law enforcement safety and security. 
In the case of United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that Fourth 
Amendment requirements on searches and seizures bar law enforcement from placing a 
global positional system (GPS) system on a vehicle to keep track of its location without a 
warrant.70 In 2004, officers investigating Jones for suspected drug trafficking employed 
various investigative techniques, including visual surveillance, to obtain a warrant to place 
an electronic tracking device on his wife’s vehicle. However, the device was installed after 
the expiration of the time period authorized in the warrant and outside the jurisdiction in 
which it was issued. Surveillance persisted for a period of 28 days and captured more than 
2,000 pages of data. The government obtained a conviction, but Jones moved to suppress 
the evidence based on a violation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment against unlawful 
search. This finding was distinguished from the earlier findings in United States v Knotts 
(1983), which held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy on public roads 
because the car’s movements were knowingly exposed to the public and could have been 
observed with the naked eye.71 Although both cases involved the placement of GPS 
tracking devices to obtain data, the former captured data over an extended period of time, 
which allowed officers to build a case that could not have been ascertained from a single 
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trip, as in the surveillance of Knotts.72 In his concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Alito 
outlined issues with the Fourth Amendment and the manner in which they relate to 21st-
century surveillance techniques. While he agreed with the judgment, he felt the focus 
should have instead been on potential privacy violations based on long-term monitoring.73 
This focus is of particular relevance to the discussion on persistent surveillance by drones. 
Although the type of drones consistent with current-day law enforcement drone use is 
limited in-flight duration, future miniaturization and technology advancement will 
continue to extend flight times. The Court’s reasoning in Jones and similar cases involved 
a technical trespass (Alito’s concurrence) in conjunction with surveillance, but with drones, 
the surveillance technology itself precludes the need to conduct a physical trespass.74 Many 
of the sensors on drones can literally see through walls. Among concerns, Justice Alito 
expressed in Jones included that “coverage of the Fourth Amendment may vary from State 
to State” based on the state’s views on marital and community property, and may serve to 
create an inconstant standard.75 Alito also outlined concerns with using the Katz 
expectation-of-privacy test in cases involving technology. Specifically, Alito discusses that 
“the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-
developed and stable set of privacy expectations.”76 Since one of the two fundamental 
elements of the Katz tests relies on that stable definition of privacy to determine 
reasonableness, shifting privacy definitions throws any determination made using Katz’s 
test into doubt. Alito posits that the desire for “[n]ew technology may provide increased 
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff 
worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new 
technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.”77 Alito suggests that the best course of action is in line with action taken 
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following Katz, which saw Congress take action to resolve the issue by developing a 
comprehensive statute, rather than leaving the issue to be resolved through court action to 
develop case law. Justice Alito closes with the acknowledgment that as of 2012, “Congress 
and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology 
for law enforcement purposes. The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case 
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”78 
Applying the same process to persistent drone surveillance, a standard for the degree of 
intrusion a reasonable person may perceive based on a lengthy overflight of public events 
is unknown. 
Emerging technologies continue to push the envelope on surveillance and provide 
both more sensitive data and an extension of the boundaries delimiting how data is 
gathered. The capture, use, and re-use of media-data are not well regulated either in public 
or by government agencies in the United States. Increasingly capable airborne sensor suites 
continue to influence actions at the forefront of how LEOs conduct investigations, manage 
public safety, and enhance awareness. During the last century, numerous instances have 
occurred wherein higher courts have had to intervene to determine whether LEOs’ use of 
technology at that time constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, was protected under 
the Fourth Amendment, or infringed on other constitutional rights. Drone-based 
surveillance marks a significant enough advancement in capability to warrant just such a 
constitutional discussion. 
These cases lay the legal bedrock for addressing the regulation and employment of 
technology as it emerges in the marketplace. Technological advancement is a rapid, 
dynamic process that will always outpace the ability to legislate and regulate it. 
Considerations need to be identified as to who has oversight and how the secondary data 
collected will be ethically utilized. Like most tools, this technology and its byproducts will 
require maintenance, care, and training for those who operate it. The ability to maintain 
some semblance of the privacy rights historically enjoyed in the United States will require 
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a candid look at society’s interaction in the current technological landscape and this 
generation’s comfort level at drawing the line between the tradeoffs of gaining capability 
versus maintaining privacy. 
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III. REGULATING TECHNOLOGY PRE-COLLECTION 
This chapter examines drone-borne surveillance technology regulation prior to 
collection events by law enforcement under an expansion of existing Title III regulation to 
include visual and other technology-enhanced sensors. This policy establishes three 
distinct areas in which surveillance collection limitations are imposed in conjunction with 
law enforcement efforts. Private cases align with current requirements for search and 
seizure as defined constitutionally under the Fourth Amendment. Public cases impose 
restrictions over identified areas of possible privacy infringement or abuse of power or 
scope, and business cases recommend regulations and access for law enforcement to 
surveillance systems run in publicly operated businesses. Effectively regulating and 
limiting surveillance technology through Title III expansion establishes a pathway for law 
enforcement to employ surveillance technology, including on drones. PEST analysis 
identifies major threats and opportunities in the external environment to employing drones 
in all aspects of the law enforcement mission effectively and provides relevant data to 
demonstrate the feasibility of implementing this policy. 
A. PRE-COLLECTION POLICY 
Given the incredibly powerful tools that exist in the market today and into the 
future, the best solution to exploiting drone-based surveillance and other future technology 
is to regulate the use of surveillance technology prior to collection events. Drones are a 
collection platform. They have no more inherent ability to violate privacy than other similar 
airborne or height-mounted platforms, for example manned aircraft or perches, as 
supported in jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of aerial surveillance. To remain 
relevant with the technological landscape, legislators should look to expand Title III and 
related legislative schema to encompass all surveillance technology and set guidelines 
based around defining three cases under which LEOs could surveil and collect data: 
private, public, and business. 
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1. Private 
In this case, the existing Title III code would be extended to capture visual and 
other yet-to-be-developed technological forms of surveillance that extend capability 
beyond natural human limitation. Along with this extension, surveillance authorization and 
capture of data would be granted in advance of surveillance events under very specific 
criteria as is required for granting warrants to conduct wiretaps and other directed-
surveillance in venues covered under Fourth Amendment privacy laws. Such provisions 
would include, at a minimum: (1) specific pre-authorization to conduct the surveillance, 
(2) strict minimization, (3) strict content identification authorizing capture and retention of 
only pre-identified subject matter, (4) strict identification of aggrieved targets, and (5) 
federal authorization to conduct the surveillance. Under this extension, law enforcement 
agents would use the existing legal framework for lawful search and seizure and other 
applicable regulations to obtain a warrant in advance of surveillance. Once granted, this 
warrant would authorize roving interception (i.e., drone tracking) and capture of target 
intelligence, following the aggrieved anywhere, public or private. Methods of surveillance 
and specific technology would be specified in the warrant in advance of the surveillance 
event. 
2. Public 
In this venue, no stricter requirements will be placed on LEOs or agents than is 
enacted on the average citizen or business operating in general public spaces. Drones and 
all drone-borne forms of visual surveillance may be employed to enhance the safety and 
security of public spaces and the safety of the officers and civilians operating in them. This 
regulation includes a standing authorization to operate drones and use visual surveillance 
methods over all major public events, planned or unplanned demonstrations, general public 
crowds and gatherings, and in response to emergent situations developing in public or 
publicly accessible spaces. Surveillance data collected incidentally in public and 
commercial spaces not intentionally tied to a specific target (aggrieved) or agenda (criminal 
action) may still be used to support the request for a Title III warrant application, in line 
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence found in Ciraolo and related cases. Countering the 
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argument expressing concern against the use of surveillance data for secondary law 
enforcement purposes, Gregory McNeal stated “for more than two decades, the police have 
not been required to turn a blind eye to evidence of criminality merely because they 
observed it from the air, they similarly should not be required to ignore evidence of 
criminality merely because they witness the crime through the eyes of a drone.”79 Finally, 
interference with law enforcement surveillance or surveillance equipment of general public 
events would be criminalized, which would result in possible fines or imprisonment, or 
both, for the perpetrator based on the severity of the event. 
3. Business 
Under this case, businesses with physical public access as part of their operations 
would be required to apply for a license to operate video surveillance systems inside 
publicly accessible spaces, regardless of the platform used to employ surveillance sensors. 
Licenses would be granted by the state through which the business was licensed to operate, 
requiring periodic training on surveillance regulations, and require the business to subject 
to inspections for compliance with state and local regulations. Surveillance data use and 
retention limits would be imposed, and penalties and fines levied against the businesses for 
violations and infractions. Businesses would further be required to cooperate with valid 
law enforcement requests for data, in line with 18 USC 2511 (2)(a)(ii).  
B. PEST ANALYSIS—MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS 
This section covers the major opportunities and threats to regulating surveillance 
technology from the perspective of political practicality, economic viability, socio-cultural 
acceptance, and technological feasibility to identify stakeholder preference and examine 
the feasibility of the proposed policy. This section identifies the benefits of expanding 
existing regulation, public appeal, and fiscal spending while highlighting drawbacks and 
fears. 
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1. Political Practicality 
From a political perspective, existing federal regulations governing other 
technology-based surveillance methods provide a strong framework for expanding drone-
based surveillance. Existing regulations very adequately address Fourth Amendment rights 
and procedures and are backed by years of reasoned jurisprudence. Expanding the umbrella 
to encompass future technology is the logical next step to ensuring privacy protection in 
the rollout of new technology. 
On the downside, this solution fails to meet the more significant issue of expanding 
regulations at the speed of innovation. Constantly evolving technology will necessitate 
numerous future reviews and expansions of this regulation to encompass not-yet-conceived 
future concepts and creative aggregation and application of existing technologies or it will 
fall to a conflicting body of case law and regulations, as was the case in Jones, which 
applied 18th-century tort law to reach a decision.80 
2. Economic Viability 
This solution allows law enforcement agencies to obtain the right technology 
solution for the situation, unit operating capability, and budget from an economic 
perspective. Small UAS, like those governed under Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 
Part 107, provide a very adequate and easily obtainable technology platform with a fairly 
easy learning curve.81 Technology quality is an inherent tradeoff with price point. Low 
cost commercially available systems, though less capable, are arguably far cheaper to 
obtain, own, and operate than manned equivalents. According to Capt. Albanese of the 
Pittsburg Police Department, the $50,000 drone program is but a mere fraction of their $3 
million helicopter, without including fuel, maintenance, and inspections.82 
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On the downside, similar to other aerial platforms, successful UAS implementation 
requires long-term funding.83 Ongoing costs are associated with technology repairs and 
upgrades, equipment loss, maintenance training and proficiency for operators, and register 
and license equipment to operate in the NAS. Sources of funding for departments are as of 
yet unidentified and may require local or federal tax increases and subsidization or the 
requirement to make other budget tradeoffs to accommodate the operation of drones by 
law enforcement departments. 
3. Socio-Cultural Likelihood of Acceptance 
From a socio-cultural perspective, drone use has broad public appeal due to the 
sheer number of diverse applications enabled by the platform. Drones offer a way for 
people to photograph or record life events from a new perspective (weddings and sports 
events), aid in jobs (realtor virtual house walkthroughs), and deliver goods to recipients 
with speed and ease (medicine, mail, and food delivery). With the right amount of public 
transparency and limitations on secondary data use, the public has shown to be very 
receptive to a myriad of drone uses. The likelihood of acceptance for this policy is high 
because it limits surveillance at the outset of drone engagements and collects only with 
sensors approved in advance by a warrant granted after demonstrating cause. In the public 
sector, drone use by law enforcement follows the same rules as everyone else. 
On the downside, drone use by law enforcement collects data in the course of 
operations intended to enforce laws and prosecute violations. Collecting data via drones in 
the course of law enforcement missions may be seen as more intrusive and suspicious than 
a physical presence. It is difficult to discern the target of a drone based on its orientation. 
Further, drone transit (point-to-point) may be perceived as a nuisance. The addition of 
business sector requirements for surveillance registration and training may be seen as a 
nuisance. Additionally, granting law enforcement access to data collected by companies in 
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the course of business will likely be opposed, similar to the FBI attempts at gaining access 
to Apple technology.84 
4. Technological Feasibility 
From a technological perspective, the hardware, sensors, and algorithms with an 
immediate benefit to the law enforcement mission set already exist as packages on 
commercially available UAS in the commercial market. Since 2016, equipped drone suites 
boast a technology called “Follow-me,” programmed to follow a person automatically to 
capture video.85 Recognition-based software coupled with vision sensors, namely Da-Jang 
Innovations (DJI) Activetrack, evaluates pictures live and follows objects or persons 
marked on the smartphone or the screen on its own.86 As both tracking and facial 
recognition accuracy evolves, law enforcement could capitalize on that technology suite to 
design campus security programs, which would recognize and track students across 
campus at night. This technology option offers a low-cost way to provide a GPS-enabled 
live security feed for students throughout campus to enhance security, or in the event of an 
incident, sound an alert and document the event on video to assist in identifying 
perpetrators. As facial recognition accuracy improves, drones overhead at such major 
events as the Boston Marathon can possibly be programmed with the images of known or 
suspected offenders to aid in prevention and apprehension. Facial recognition also has a 
role in protecting privacy. By aggregating facial recognition with visual sensors and 
automatic redaction algorithms, capture events of suspects could blur out non-target faces 
at the time of data capture to protect against inadvertent third-party privacy intrusion. 
Facial recognition and GPS tracking are limited prior to collection under the consensual 
intercept provision when used in public. These technologies are a boon to law enforcement 
and are authorized directly by the subject being surveilled. 
 
84 “The FBI Wanted a Backdoor to the IPhone. Tim Cook Said No,” Wired, accessed November 11, 
2020, https://www.wired.com/story/the-time-tim-cook-stood-his-ground-against-fbi/. 
85 Fintan Corrigan, “12 Best Follow Me Drones and Follow You Technology Reviewed,” DroneZon, 
October 18, 2020, https://www.dronezon.com/drone-reviews/best-follow-me-gps-mode-drone-technology-
reviewed/. 
86 “DJI ActiveTrack Mode Explained,” Tom’s Tech Time, accessed November 4, 2020, 
https://www.tomstechtime.com/active-track-mode. 
43 
On the downside, limited application occurs under Title III for prosecutions. Drones 
are an overt surveillance platform, and identifying a drone would allow perpetrators 
specifically to thwart surveillance efforts or alter criminal behavior. Drones are also 
vulnerable to spoofing, physical deterrence, and other methods of interference that would 
render the captured data useless. Timeliness is also a factor. The time required to meet the 
criteria to gain authorization to surveil a suspect legally may exceed the window of 
opportunity to gain a relevant visual collection. Planning preceding events is more likely 
to occur and be captured through data and audio surveillance methods, whereas visual 
surveillance is more likely to document criminal events in action. 
C. ADDRESSING CORE CONCERNS 
This proposal adequately addresses core concerns 1 and 2 by providing specific and 
overarching criteria by which to conduct visual surveillance for law enforcement purposes 
under an expansion of Title III. Title III has met the requirements of Fourth Amendment 
constitutionality, and by extension, will provide a mechanism to ensure visual surveillance 
meets the same. States can craft more restrictive individual policies than Title III, but none 
may fail to meet the federal minimum surveillance standard. 
This proposal adequately addresses core concern 3 by providing a standing federal 
framework under which all states will be held to the same standards of probable cause, and 
reasonable suspicion, before the collection of surveillance data is authorized. By extension, 
visual surveillance data collected will be held to the same rigorous standards already 
applied to data collected by other surveillance means. 
This proposal does not directly address core concern 4, jurisprudence surrounding 
extending interpretations to beyond natural human observation capability as a standard. 
However, existing jurisprudence surrounding aerial surveillance from manned platforms 
and definitions of airspace over private property (curtilage) provide a basis on which to 
make future determination on the extent to which advances in technology will replace the 
“naked eye aerial observation” standard observe in Ciraolo.87 
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Concern 5 falls outside the scope of Title III, and therefore, is not met. As outlined 
in concern 5, consent issues would instead fall to existing state regulations outside the 
scope of this proposal. 
D. TRADEOFFS AND FEASIBILITY 
Under a PEST analysis, the macro-environmental factors examined in an 
environmental scan inform strategic planning processes. In the following section, the pros 
and cons of implementing a policy to regulate surveillance technology before collection 
specific to Title III are examined. 
1. Pros and Cons 
Updating Title III codifies the appropriate use of visual surveillance at the federal 
level and removes the ambiguity of allowing each state to dictate individual limitations 
entirely or forego regulation. Collection events are cleared in advance, and the technology 
approved for collections is appropriate to the offense perpetrated. The legality of collecting 
and the authorized scope of the collection are approved based on the evidence presented 
ahead of time and reviewed by competent federal authority. This solution is most closely 
aligned with current-day audio and data interception law, and as such, has arguably 
addressed and assuaged issues surrounding Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. 
This solution has limited inherent mechanisms to capture all variants of technology 
that will be developed in the foreseeable future. Much like the current Title III, today’s 
language to capture surveillance capability will be rendered obsolete over time as 
technology continues to morph. 
2. Feasibility 
This solution is feasible. The framework and mechanisms required to update Title 
III are in place and have been used before to address the changing landscape in the field of 
technology. The original Title III laws were amended to accommodate the shift from 
landline-based phone systems to cellular and mobile systems. This law was also modified 
to allow for the interception of broad forms of data associated with both cellular networks 
and the internet data transmission platform. Cameras and surveillance systems are 
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commonplace in society and readily available to all U.S. citizens. Equipping law 
enforcement agencies and ensuring valid legal mechanisms for creating actionable data for 
prosecutions is the next logical step to preventing an abuse of power. 
E. COUNTERARGUMENTS, CAVEATS, AND ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Regulation at the individual state level may be more appropriate to determine 
surveillance requirements and limitations. Many states have already established video 
surveillance laws appropriate to the local environment and will be resistant to federal 
mandates on an issue already adequately resolved at a lower level. 
1. Difficulty Implementing 
The resultant benefit of codifying visual surveillance into Title III law will yield a 
minimal benefit compared to the amount of effort it will take to expand the legislation. It 
will be challenging to find someone willing to sponsor and champion the change given the 
pushback from key players, including state government, the ACLU, and the general public 
against providing a federal mechanism to surveil U.S. citizens on U.S. soil visually. 
2. Difficulty Acting On and Obstacles to Execution 
The window of opportunity on emergent collection opportunities is short. A 
thorough federal review of probable cause and other elements necessary to meet Title III 
requirements will likely prove too lengthy to capitalize on most visual surveillance 
opportunities. 
3. Shortcomings 
Assigning long-term ongoing visual surveillance on a specific target is not likely to 
provide useful information. Drones are easily spotted and thwarted; additionally, they 
currently have very limited flight profiles in terms of duration. Other surveillance methods 
are currently superior to drone-based video surveillance for gathering intelligence during 
extended collects. Drones are best suited to acting as a force multiplier to increase visual 
coverage areas in short-term applications, for example over protests or demonstrations, 
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crowd control, and situational tools in advance of special weapons and tactics (SWAT)-
style breaches. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Title III adequately protects against privacy infringement, and its expansion will 
ensure the safety and security of U.S. citizens are provided at the highest level possible 
using the most advanced technological means on the market today. A federally mandated 
limitation framework serves to assuage the fear of the “unknown” when it comes to when 
and how technology is ultimately employed, as all states and jurisdictions are held to the 
same constitutionally derived federal standard. Title III expansion to encompass visual 
surveillance provides a consistent, enforceable legislative framework to place 
technological advances in law enforcement agents’ hands at all levels. The examination of 
successful uses of facial recognition technology in the daily lives of citizens, studies 
performed by the ALCU and Amazon, and the outcomes drawn from applicable case law, 
all support that the responsible use of facial recognition technology by LEOs during active 
investigations is warranted. The overarching goal of this recommended expansion is to get 
the available tools into the hands of frontline peace officers. 
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IV. REGULATING DATA POST-COLLECTION 
This chapter examines data regulation after collection events by law enforcement 
through the creation of new data retention and uses legislation. This chapter discusses six 
broad recommendations covering the basic outline of responsible data management for law 
enforcement personnel that include data minimization, redaction, validation, data 
actionability, retention, and destruction schedules, extension petition procedures, and 
constitutionally derived external access procedures to ensure Fourth Amendment rights are 
preserved. PEST analysis identifies major threats and opportunities in the external 
environment to employing drones effectively in all aspects of the law enforcement mission 
and also provides relevant data to demonstrate the feasibility of implementing this policy. 
Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, stated in an 
interview, “the problem isn’t data, the problem is data collection.”88 While many software 
applications and tools assist in reducing secondary data capture, the lack of data control 
calls for specifically established measures to prevent infobesity, determine longevity, 
enable appropriate secondary access and use, control aggregation, establish relevance, 
define persistence, and answer the question of reasonableness without ambiguity through 
legislation or body of case law. Data control following collection is fundamental to 
determining the constitutionality of the collection. Transparency in how the data will be 
used and by whom is a determinant in protecting privacy. 
A. DATA REGULATION POLICY 
The most logical course of action for legislators is to adopt data retention and usage 
policies that minimize unnecessary data storage and control access and dissemination after 
collection. Legislative policies should establish guidelines for facial recognition-based 
targeting and non-subject auto-redaction, establish two-party data validation, develop time-
limited data actionability, retention, and archival limit schedules, and require federal access 
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procedures for data otherwise protected under the Constitution, including proving 
reasonable suspicion or demonstrating probable cause. This recommendation requires the 
acceptance of five key assumptions regarding surveillance as a discipline: (1) no 
established federal limits are placed on visual surveillance, (2) visual surveillance 
enhanced by technological aid (drone, scope, or sensor) is treated as legally equivalent to 
in-person visual observation, (3) privacy expectations continue to remain at currently 
reduced levels and will further decline with the mass public acceptance of widely available 
advanced technological devices, (4) commercial spaces with public access will be treated 
as public spaces, with no reasonable expectation of privacy during the time the public is 
reasonably expected to have access to that particular establishment, and (5) in cases where 
it is in the best interest to the safety of law enforcement personnel or other citizens, visual 
surveillance methods that provide live visual feedback without data capture are authorized 
in private domains.  
From these key assumptions, legislators should develop a federal framework to 
steer the regulation and treatment of captured data. All captured surveillance data, 
regardless of the collection device, should adhere to standardized retention procedures. Six 
broad recommendations covering the basic outline of responsible data management for law 
enforcement personnel are as follows: 
∑ Data should be minimized during, or immediately following, collection.89 
∑ Non-relevant data not automatically redacted using drone-based software 
and algorithms should be screened and deleted prior to storage and 
backup.  
∑ Data deemed relevant to an actionable offense or data-of-interest should 
be validated by two-party assessment (by agents of two unrelated 
 




agencies), then duplicated and archived to protect data integrity and 
prevent potential tampering.  
∑ Data should be deemed actionable for X years; then, once it has reached 
the statute of limitations, it should be archived for an additional Y years. 
Following the period of the archive, the data should be destroyed.  
∑ Data meeting the criteria for an extenuating circumstance requires that a 
federal court grant a petition for an extension of the archive.  
∑ Data captured by surveillance meeting the criteria for privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment requires that a federal court grant access to the data 
and only deem it actionable based on similar criteria and cause to that 
currently required for issuing warrants.  
1. Key Assumption 1: No Federal Limits Placed on Visual Surveillance 
Smartphones and other hand-held electronic devices have revolutionized the way 
the world interacts. According to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Technology 
Review, the smartphone “[reached] 40 percent market saturation in just 2½ years.”90 
Smartphones have disrupted and displaced major market segments in such areas as GPS 
and visual capture (video and images). A true pocket PC, smartphones have acted as a 
capability-leveler that takes the place of a multitude of high-cost specialty technology 
devices and replaces them with a ubiquitous tool no bigger than a small notepad. Gone are 
the days of large VHS cameras lugged around by just a few to special events in a suitcase. 
High-definition video capture, data storage, and streaming access are nearly universally 
available baked into even the least-equipped smartphones so prevalent in today’s tech-
savvy world. Visual surveillance in public spaces is a foregone conclusion. While 
legislation cannot reasonably stop the world from capturing all media, regulating the use 
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of data after the fact of capture is not yet a lost cause. Data regulation is in its infancy but 
arguably very necessary to preserve privacy in an increasingly tech-centric future. 
2. Key Assumption 2: Tech-Enhanced Visual Surveillance Is Legally 
Equivalent In-person Visual Observation 
In his article on considerations for legislators, Gregory McNeal talks at length about 
the “demonization” of drones as a technology stemming from a fear of “persistent 
surveillance.”91 It is easy for organizations like the ACLU to rally support behind privacy 
concerns when the object of their focus is visible, audible, and instantly recognizable and 
operating in the immediate vicinity. Drones are relatively new to the scene, having joined 
the national airspace system only as recently as 2015 when they were incorporated 
following the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (2012).92 However, drones are simply 
a vehicle for positioning a sensor. Calls for regulating drones to tackle the issue of 
surveillance are about as credible as calls to regulate the feet of the police officers who 
wear body cams. Regulations restricting drone use as a method to curtail surveillance hold 
the drone as a platform to a higher constitutional standard than similar, legal methods of 
surveillance whose validity has been found constitutional through jurisprudence. Drone-
based surveillance is akin to any other airborne method and is arguably less capable than 
other current methods due to the payload and flight duration limitations of current-day 
UAS.  
3. Key Assumption 3: Privacy Expectations Surrounding Technology 
Today Are Reduced and Declining 
In line with key assumption 1, prevailing attitudes surrounding technology have 
shifted largely to acceptance. People today willingly provide such data as age, gender, 
preferences, physical location, and others, in exchange for a tailored solution or 
convenience. On-board GPS and navigation systems track not only present location but 
also save previous destinations and preferred routing. Dating apps and social media 
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accounts collect both information directly input by users and determine associations based 
on common connections to provide friend or dating suggestions, including providing a 
user’s current physical location information to potential contacts. As evinced by Justice 
Alito:  
When a user activates the GPS on such a phone, a provider is able to monitor 
the phone’s location and speed of movement and can then report back real-
time traffic conditions after combining (crowdsourcing) the speed of all 
such phones on any particular road. Similarly, phone-location-tracking 
services are offered as ‘social’ tools, allowing consumers to find (or to 
avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availability and use of these 
and other new devices will continue to shape the average person’s 
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.93  
Data collected in law enforcement surveillance events under this policy will be 
redacted and stored under very specific guidelines, which are far more transparent than 
data collected by other parties. Transparency and consistency in regulation will sway 
opinions of this policy toward acceptance. 
4. Key Assumption 4: Public Access Spaces, to Include Businesses, Are 
Subject to Surveillance 
As touched on earlier, the prevailing theme through much of the relevant 
jurisprudence is that the expectation of protection from aerial viewing is not reasonable 
when it is conducted from a lawful public vantage point, either airborne or from an 
otherwise elevated position. This standard holds true for curtilage, which is far more likely 
to raise concerns toward privacy infringement than general public space. Businesses 
conduct operations in and with the public, and the decision to surveil operations should be 
at the discretion of the business. However, should a business choose to surveil the public, 
it should have a duty to do so responsibly in full compliance with the current laws, 
regulations, and in line with a 2015 Presidential Memorandum, which sought to “promote 
economic competitiveness while safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in 
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domestic use of unmanned aircraft systems.”94 The memorandum outlines expectations of 
privacy protection in section (a), “to the extent that such collection or use is consistent with 
and relevant to an authorized purpose;” limiting retention of information containing PII to 
180 days, without specific overriding authorization; and preventing dissemination “unless 
dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with 
agency requirements.”95 Under the last provision, to support law enforcement efforts better 
inside the 180-day data retention window, law enforcement agents’ requests for access to 
data should be honored by businesses to the maximum practicable extent. Finally, as with 
all other publicly accessible space, if a police officer wearing a bodycam may lawfully 
enter the space, a similarly equipped drone should not be held to a higher constitutional 
standard. 
5. Key Assumption 5: In the Best Interest of Safety, no Domain (Public or 
Private) Is Restricted from Non-recorded Surveillance 
In a policy debate mediated by the Urban Institute, Spokane Police Chief Frank 
Straub discussed, in a scenario of probable domestic violence, how a question of consent, 
victim advocacy, and police bodycams prompted a change in policy. Chief Straub 
explained that:  
we changed our policies as a result of some of these discussions. 
Specifically, around the issue of turning off the cameras when entering 
someone’s private residence (somewhat tied to Washington State’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the fact that we are a two-party 
consent state). During the discussion, a woman in the audience [asked] what 
I would do if I responded to a domestic violence call and her husband 
answered the door and told me to turn off the camera while she was in the 
background asking for the recording to continue. We made the policy 
change that we would not arbitrarily turn the cameras off but would keep 
them on unless the victim requested that we turn them off.96  
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When lives are on the line, in the context of privacy versus security, safety should 
universally win out. Privacy infringement can always be addressed after the fact. 
By regulating data following collection, rather than trying to regulate each new 
advancement in technology, legal protections are able to keep pace with advances in 
technology. These procedures are in line with the recommended UAS voluntary best 
practices to address privacy, transparency, and accountability issues related to private and 
commercial use of UASs agreed upon by major stakeholders in 2016, which was developed 
at the request of President Barack Obama.97 Best practices include informing affected 
persons of UAS use and the collection of data, taking care in the collection and storage of 
information that identifies a particular person, limiting the use and sharing of such data, 
securing data that has been collected, and monitoring and complying with the law as it 
evolves.98 
Further, in the interest of maintaining consistency in the regulation and operation 
of UASs, and the safety of the NAS as a whole, the regulation of UAS operations should 
remain the jurisdiction of the FAA. “Substantial air safety issues are raised when the state 
or local governments attempt to regulate the operation or flight of aircraft. If one or two 
municipalities enacted ordinances regulating UAS in the navigable airspace and a 
significant number of municipalities followed suit, fractionalized control of the navigable 
airspace could result.”99  
B. PEST ANALYSIS—MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS 
This section covers the major opportunities and threats for implementing a data 
collection and retention framework. Minimizing the collection of non-relevant data, 
transparency, length of time to retain data, and funding are a few factors that stakeholders 
consider. 
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1. Political Practicality 
From a political perspective, standardization through federal regulation makes laws 
both more consistent between agencies and easier to enforce from a law enforcement 
perspective. Disparate uses and budgets create a haphazard set of rules and guidelines that 
vary widely between states or within states at a county or local level as jurisdictions 
disagree on what and how technology should be allowed. Federal data regulation acts as a 
consistent baseline for the treatment of data. 
On the downside, state regulation can be more easily tailored to fit the needs of 
programs already in place or designed to meet the needs of individual state’s law 
enforcement drone usage profiles. Federal regulation regarding the treatment of data may 
make the collection of routine data too time-consuming and costly for small-scale law 
enforcement outfits to participate. 
2. Economic Viability  
From an economic perspective, data and information security career fields have 
seen a sharp uptick in demand for professionals to build networks and security systems to 
ensure data safety and integrity. As a byproduct of shifting to a data regulation-centric 
model, skilled jobs will emerge in response to expanding data protections for both 
surveillance data and other public networks.100 The rise in requirements to provide data 
integrity and security in conjunction with drone use will likely expand across all law 
enforcement data systems. 
On the downside, generating the budget or funding lines for new technology and 
computer systems required to comply with data security and storage requirements may 
prove to be financially insurmountable. Small budget districts may be required to layoff 
personnel in exchange for rising data storage costs or may find that maintaining such data 
systems outweighs the benefit of utilizing drones for even routine law enforcement 
applications. 
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3. Socio-Cultural Likelihood of Acceptance 
From a socio-cultural perspective, the regulation of data to ensure accountability 
and transparency was the consensus as a basis for the best approach by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration and other major stakeholders in 
developing voluntary best practices. Among the best practices were the recommendations 
to take care of the collection and storage of data, limit the use and sharing of collected data, 
ensure data security, and comply with the law as it evolves.101 Although not meant to guide 
regulatory creation, these best practices are in line with the recommendations put forth in 
this solution. 
On the downside, according to reporting on Pew Research Center, surveys found 
that “Americans also have exceedingly low levels of confidence in the privacy and security 
of the records that are maintained by a variety of institutions in the digital age.”102 Between 
the large-scale data mining operations by the National Security Agency (NSA) and such 
cybersecurity incidents as the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) major data 
breach (2015) targeting the sensitive information of millions, people are justifiably 
concerned with the large-scale, long-term massing of data.103 
4. Technological Feasibility  
From a technological perspective, data solutions are advancing rapidly. Such 
methods as cloud and hybrid cloud computing offer relatively inexpensive data solutions 
designed to address privacy and network security issues as part of a total data solution. 
Existing solutions using cloud computing architecture could lessen the burden and massive 
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technological hurdle of designing a safe, economical solution that allows for expanding 
data capacity from the ground up.104 
On the downside, any online forum is at a higher risk of attempts to gain 
unauthorized access to data in the system. While networking increases the opportunity for 
interagency sharing, the data is vulnerable to external hack or other malicious attempts to 
gain access.  
C. ADDRESSING CORE CONCERNS 
This proposal does not address core concerns 1 or 2 by creating regulations to 
control visual surveillance. This proposal instead reaches a satisfactory middle ground 
between privacy and security by enabling all use of available technology to ensure security 
while protecting privacy rights by the careful treatment of collected data. 
This policy adequately meets core concern 3 by proposing specific use guidelines 
and retention schedules to ensure data is protected and relevant to the issue for which it 
was collected in conjunction with UAS use by law enforcement agencies. 
This policy negates core concern 4, because all forms of surveillance are 
authorized, with data redaction after collection addressing any and all concerns over 
privacy that may arise with collected data. 
This policy does not specifically address core concern 5, but leaves the discussion 
surrounding multi-party consent and visual surveillance by LEOs to existing state 
regulation, which falls outside this proposal’s scope. However, any data collected under 
state rules would receive the same privacy protections as other data collections, as 
specifically outlined in the proposal. 
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D. TRADEOFFS AND FEASIBILITY  
Under a PEST analysis, the macro-environmental factors examined in an 
environmental scan inform strategic planning processes. In the following section, the pros 
and cons of implementing a policy to regulate data after collection. 
1. Pros and Cons 
Law enforcement is freely able to capitalize on technology to enhance job 
performance and increase the safety of officers and citizens alike. Video surveillance 
provides for the capture of unbiased data, which may be subsequently used to corroborate 
events and prosecute crimes. Overt surveillance also acts as a deterrent to crime and an 
inherent de-escalation tool. When people are under observation, they are more likely to be 
on their “best behavior.” 
However, data quality and fidelity are subject to and affected by environmental 
conditions, technical malfunctions, equipment limitations, weather, and other external 
factors. Collected data is also subject to corruption during collection, transfer, and storage 
over time. Although a collection event may be valid, the resulting product may be 
insufficient or too unreliable to be utilized for its intended prosecution. Overreliance on 
technology over time may also reduce the skills and abilities of the officers, for example, 
observation, attention to detail, and recall. Spokane Police Chief Frank Staub cited the time 
required to redact video footage captured by police-worn body cameras as “approximately 
2½ hours per one hour of video/audio.”105 Assuming a similar processing time for other 
forms of visual capture, processing large amounts of video footage may prove too time-
consuming to justify the benefit gained. 
2. Feasibility 
This recommendation is feasible, as it does not overturn any standing legislation or 
regulations against the use of video surveillance in public. Public video surveillance is 
widely, successfully used by criminal organizations and near peers and is a demonstrated 
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model for success. Data capture, screening, and storage capability exist to the level required 
to execute this recommendation in the present day. 
E. COUNTERARGUMENTS, CAVEATS, AND ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS 
This recommendation brings the United States one step closer to being a 
surveillance state, where every action is monitored and potentially prosecuted. The NSA 
has pushed the boundaries of reasonable surveillance with little oversight. COVID has 
opened the door to tracking people for the “greater good,” particularly through cell phone 
contact tracing and geolocation.106 Without some form of limits on data collection, 
eventually, no element of an individual’s life will not be captured and sold, despite the best 
efforts at regulating data.  
1. Difficulty Implementing 
At all levels, the U.S. government currently lacks the infrastructure and personnel 
to store, screen, and maintain data in the volume to be collected. A current funding source 
or budget does not exist to establish or maintain this system over the long haul. 
2. Difficulty Acting on and Obstacles to Execution 
Screening inherently introduces the bias of the screener on the captured data. 
Taking data out of the context from which it was recorded and retaining it, in part, threatens 
the integrity of the data as a whole. Dave McClure, Research Associate, expressed his 
concerns with the redaction of data, stating, “any redaction of citizen(s) actions—for the 
sake of protecting their privacy—removes critical context for understanding the officer’s 
actions. Without context, pretty much any instance of an officer physically restraining a 
suspect is going to look like a case of police brutality.”107 Inherent bias will lead to possible 
exclusion in cases using the data for prosecution. The data is also highly susceptible to 
theft. The 21st century has seen numerous major data breaches exposing private 
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information to the public, often for sale with malicious intent. Even systems thought to be 
secure have suffered damaging hacks and such breaches as the Equifax breach on July 29, 
2017, which exposed the sensitive information of more than 143 million people.108 
3. Shortcomings 
This recommendation does not provide a viable mechanism for capturing visual 
surveillance in areas protected under the Fourth Amendment, even with a warrant or 
probable cause, because data retention and sharing concerns are not adequately addressed.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Today, consumers are more willing to submit to an invasion of privacy in exchange 
for the convenience and benefits gained through technological apps and other niceties of 
information-age commerce. However, this enthusiasm wanes significantly when 
technology and its subsequent data collection products are applied to the benefit of law 
enforcement. Drone surveillance of such major public events as the Boston Marathon 
requires a persistent period of surveillance over a large number of people, coverage that 
would capture and preserve a wide range of activity and actions.109 While actions in public 
are not covered under the “right to privacy,” invariably, events will be held during which 
coverage may be construed as quasi-legal or in violation of minor law and statutes. Data 
captured under the pretext of large event crowd control could subsequently be scanned in 
depth by other agencies with the intent of discovering illicit activity. Without a solid 
framework for the treatment of collected data, the statute of limitations on gathering and 
aggregating a behavioral history on a person of interest could stretch out indefinitely.  
In this case, it is prudent to limit the ability of technology, based not on its capability 
to collect, but instead based on the moral responsibility to retain data appropriately and 
within well-defined limitations. To that end, regulation should focus on the privacy 
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concerns of captured data after the fact, regardless of the technology employed during the 
collection.  
The legal process of protecting U.S. citizens is as impressive as it is slow. It is a 
comprehensive process designed to deliberate and measure carefully to achieve the most 
just and balanced outcome, but is by nature ill equipped to adapt at the speed of innovation. 
Data, and how to protect it in the information age, is far better suited to the discussion of 
protecting privacy. This recommendation’s overarching goal is to get the available tools 
into the hands of frontline patrol to ensure the American society maintains the capability 
to preserve the safety and security of the United States and its citizens. The United States 
is behind the power curve with near peers and adversaries who are more than willing to 
implement technology to their advantage. It will be difficult to maintain a competitive edge 
into the future as people are overrun by more-capable and better-equipped criminal 
elements. The time to act is the present, by putting the appropriate technological advances 
in the hands of law enforcement agents and regulating the collected data on the backside 
to ensure Fourth Amendment rights are preserved and an abuse of power is prevented. 
Adopting sound data retention procedures post-collection ensures against privacy 
infringement and prevents extensive data storage longevity, which may result in the 
potential for misuse, mishandling, or theft in the future. Regulating data focuses collection 
on relevance and stops data infobesity in its tracks. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A failure to equip state and local law enforcement agents properly can create an 
asymmetric engagement wherein the balance of power, and the technical advantage, lies 
with the criminal element. Criminal enterprises in today’s society enjoy the full benefits of 
a technology-rich operating environment created by the free-market availability of COTS 
equipment. On the other hand, decades-old and obsolete federal surveillance regulations or 
reactionary overly restrictive and inconsistent state controls provide a daunting obstacle to 
capitalizing on technology while enforcing U.S. laws and maintaining a safe, well-
regulated society.  
Each solution represents a sound approach to employing drones effectively in 
society to increase the safety and security of public spaces within the United States without 
unduly infringing on the privacy of its citizens. Regulating technology in advance of 
collection events allows agents specifically to protect privacy and tailor capability to limit 
the collection of data to only that which is authorized and relevant to a specific crime or 
action. Conversely, collecting data widely in conjunction with all police action, provides a 
better context for the data collected, as well as enhancing transparency, accountability, and 
public trust. 
Additionally, both solutions also present some challenges to achieving the goal. 
Requiring that probable cause and specific evidence be demonstrated prior to visual 
collection events may specifically preclude capturing the event. Many events that would 
benefit from corroborative visual surveillance occur and resolve rapidly, and a lengthy 
authorization time would result in a missed opportunity to gather vital evidence. Similarly, 
unregulated video surveillance with a nearly unlimited collection of data may serve to 
provide more data than can be processed and stored, and redaction tied to preserving rights 
may strip the data of the context required to understand and employ it in prosecuting 
suspects accurately. In either case, the lack of actionable resulting data makes the cost of 
implementation and maintenance unconscionable.  
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A. STAKEHOLDERS 
Comparing the major stakeholders’ preferences derived from the PEST analysis 
(Table 2, Appendix B) reveals that the overall consensus is more favorable toward 
regulation before collection. The prevailing public attitude, though it has shifted away from 
ultra-privacy in current generations, is still wary of the dangers of becoming an unchecked 
surveillance state. By requiring that actual evidence and probable cause are both required 
and vetted through a federal review and requiring minimization, privacy concerns are 
adequately addressed. Arguably, the public consensus is most likely in line with the 
proposal of regulation before collection.  
Law enforcement recognizes the immense benefit of having drones and other 
technology available to assist officers in all aspects of the job. Regulation before collection 
at a federal level is overly complicated and bureaucratic; additionally, it will preclude the 
ability to apply the necessary technology to all but the most stringently justified 
circumstances. The majority of the benefit immediately realized from drones and similar 
technology is in widescale public applications to aid overall situational awareness, for 
example during protests and rallies, large public events, emergent crowd control 
requirements, and on-scene accident investigation. This type of employment is best 
supported by regulation after collection. 
The ACLU has come out firmly against recent advances, by citing bias and 
unreliability in facial recognition technology.110 Given the inherent bias not only in 
algorithms programmed to accomplish automatic recognition and the idea of mass 
surveillance of the public at large, the ACLU would likely be firmly against implementing 
broad area drone surveillance of all public spaces as a norm. Although regulation before 
collection provides the inherent mechanisms for protecting against undue infringement of 
privacy and Fourth Amendment rights, the ACLU is unlikely to support the expansion of 
Title III due to the inherently invasive nature of the technology in play. 
 
110 Snow, “Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots.”  
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The government has important stakeholders at all levels, from local to federal. 
Expanding Title III to capture visual surveillance allows for greater standardization and 
broader control over implementation in all 50 states. As it stands today, states have no 
consensus and very few limitations regulating visual surveillance. Each state is free to 
implement controls or not. Only about a third of U.S. states require local and state law 
enforcement agencies to request a warrant prior to performing a search or surveillance with 
UAS technology.111 The spectrum of regulations varies. For instance, Oregon prohibits 
law enforcement from using UAS except when: (1) authorized use upon issuance of 
warrant (surveil no more than 30 days), (2) written consent, (3) emergency operations, (4) 
investigations of crimes and accidents, and (5) training.112 Whereas Wisconsin allows law 
enforcement agencies to use drones “in a public place or to assist in an active search and 
rescue operation, to locate an escaped prisoner, to surveil a place or location for the purpose 
of executing an arrest warrant, or if a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the use of a drone is necessary to prevent imminent danger to an individual or 
to prevent [the] imminent destruction of evidence.”113 The federal government would 
likely lean favorably toward regulation before collection, whereas state and local 
governments would likely prefer to retain regulation at a lower level. From the standpoint 
of how society currently operates and the current-day use of visual recording technology 
by the public, regulation after collection would be the most logical transition toward 
regulating data without disrupting the status quo. 
Businesses become a key stakeholder primarily when discussing the critical 
assumption that commercial spaces with public access would be treated as public space 
with no inherent right to prevent surveillance. This assumption is especially critical to the 
discussion of regulation after collection. Under this solution, drones operating in the public 
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domain could enter and operate all spaces occupied by the public or spaces in which the 
public had access for business transactions. The opportunity to catch unrelated infractions 
in day-to-day business operations and the ability to pass that information off to relevant 
agencies for prosecution or on request would likely dissuade businesses from supporting 
the regulation. Although most businesses operate legitimately, by nature of some 
businesses, they are not in compliance with all laws and requirements at every moment of 
every day. A recording makes no gray differentiation for “in process,” it merely documents 
compliance or failure. While businesses likely have no opinion on regulation before 
collection, the consensus would likely be against regulation after collection, instead 
preferring that law enforcement only enter for surveillance with cause. 
A closer examination of the feasibility factors (Table 1, Appendix B) reveals no 
clearly predominant solution. Regulating technology before collection was overall positive 
in the political, economic, and technological feasibility categories. Regulation after 
collection was overall positive in the political, social, and technological categories.114 
From an economic standpoint, expanding Title III regulation is not directly associated with 
the ongoing costs of manning, training, and equipping law enforcement agents nationwide 
at all levels of enforcement. Although it is feasible with today’s technology and data 
management methods to achieve the storage infrastructure required for the solution of 
regulating data after collection, the funding mechanism is not currently identified and 
would likely result in the loss of manned capability in markets with small budgets. The 
staggering economic cost of fully implementing regulation after collection makes it 
inherently less feasible than expanding Title III and implementing regulation before 
collection. 
B. ADDRESSED CONCERNS 
Three out of the five core concerns can be fulfilled by addressing the deficiencies 
in Title III and incorporating a pre-collection subsection to the existing framework. 
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Amendments to Title III allow law enforcement agencies to conduct visual surveillance 
with drones by providing a mechanism to ensure visual surveillance meets the Fourth 
Amendment requirements. Additionally, amending Title III standardizes federal regulation 
under which all states will be held to the same standards of probable cause, and reasonable 
suspicion before the collection of surveillance data is authorized. By extension, visual 
surveillance data collected by drones will be held to the same standards applied to other 
image and video surveillance means (e.g., body-worn cameras). States would be permitted 
to implement more restrictive policies than Title III; however, none may fail to meet the 
minimum federal standard. 
Similar to the pre-collection solution, a post-collection data regulation option 
would address concern 3 by providing specific use guidelines and retention schedules to 
ensure data is protected and relevant to the issue for which it was collected in conjunction 
with UAS use by law enforcement agencies. Data regulation and retention also provides 
an opportunity for such redaction technology as geofencing and image distortion 
applications, to protect citizens captured through secondary data collection while limiting 
biometric data storage. Unfortunately, data regulation does not prevent the excessive and 
rogue use of drone-borne sensors that infringe on U.S. citizens’ liberty and privacy. 
Furthermore, a post-collection solution does not deter or prohibit unreasonable searches 
and seizures, nor does it adequately provide mission-specific transparency.  
Regulating technology prior to collection provides the best solution to aiding law 
enforcement engagement in cases of a specific target, and the data will be captured in areas 
considered private in line with Fourth Amendment protection. Regulating and controlling 
data after collection is the most logical solution to addressing video surveillance in public 
spaces, regardless of the agent or entity capturing the data or the media used in the capture. 
Overall, the best solution may be found in a combination of both. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
UASs offer a myriad of benefits to the law enforcement mission, most of which 
pose no threat to privacy, as the aforementioned examples show. Therefore, creating 
legislation completely restricting UAVs’ use based on the fear of possible privacy 
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infringement is not warranted. The discussion about protecting liberty and providing 
security does not have to be a zero-sum game. To that end, the best way to achieve parity 
in the effective employment of drones by law enforcement agents is a combination of the 
previous policies, coupled with a healthy dose of old-fashioned respect. Law enforcement 
agents should capitalize on the diverse multi-mission capability of drones across all aspects 
of policing. Private spaces should retain the reasonable expectation of the privacy standard, 
as defined in Justice Harlan’s two-part test, wherein an actual subjective expectation of 
privacy exists, and society is prepared to recognize it as reasonable.115 In other words, if 
and when technology is used to see into private spaces, permission must first be sought, 
and for a good reason. Otherwise, it is a function of “what you see is what you collect.” 
Lastly, data collection and retention should be guided under the spirit of “community 
policing,” working collaboratively with the public and agencies to improve relations and 
create a safer society for everyone participating in it.116 
Increased communication and community awareness regarding drone use by law 
enforcement agencies are critical to finding the middle ground between realizing UAS’ 
benefits and preserving liberty. The following recommended best practices apply to both 
solutions: 
∑ Build public trust through transparency and accountability practices 
∑ Publicize scrubbed flight logs and data use; tie to positive outcomes 
(public relations) 
∑ Highlight lesser-known drone missions (event safety, accident 
investigation, etc.) 
∑ Publicly release captured footage of non-sensitive surveillance actions  
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Responsible data handling procedures and limitations are a reality of the 
Information Age. Sound data management practices underpin the success of both of the 
policy recommendations put forth. Although data management is central to the post-
collection data solution, it is inherent in successfully regulating technology application to 
ensure that the data subsequently collected may be applied for its intended purpose, as 
evidence in the judiciary process. To that end: 
∑ Collect information with an eye toward eliminating “infobesity” and 
“analysis paralysis” by redaction and exclusion of non-relevant data. 
∑ Preserve the integrity of data, and set a reasonable limitation schedule for 
the aggregation, retention, redaction, and destruction of data. 
∑ Only grant access to data with “good cause” or under reasonable 
constitutional standards criteria. 
Increased safety and security throughout society is the win-win achieved through 
transparency, collaboration, and mutual respect in the law enforcement element’s use of 
UAS in the United States. 
Consensual interception falls outside the scope of Title III authorization or data 
regulation policy, but it is essential to capture in legislation moving forward. “Consensual 
interception” covers instances where either the LEO or agent is a party to a conversation 
or one of any of the parties involved in a conversation gives consent to being monitored, 
or when there is no justifiable expectation of privacy. Consent to visual surveillance varies 
greatly as to the requirements from state to state, and not all states have enacted laws 
concerning visual surveillance. Consistent consensual monitoring exceptions would enable 
law enforcement elements to capitalize on such technology as the follow-me tracking and 
facial recognition software to identify and escort people on request in situations where they 
felt threatened, for example, on college campuses at night or through neighborhoods with 
a history of opportunistic crime. In departments where manning is critical, having an escort 
that can follow, geolocate, and alert authorities is an invaluable force multiplier. As 
discussed earlier in this thesis, a framework consistent across all states that will expand 
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consensual interception to visual surveillance opens the door for the extension of 
surveillance as a safety measure or victim advocate.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Providing a regulated and appropriate physical presence (man or machine) is 
necessary to deter and stop criminal activity and ensure U.S. citizens’ safety and security. 
Surveillance data collected by drone-borne sensors furthers that goal. The original question 
asks whether domestic law enforcement agencies should expand their jurisdiction to 
provide protection and intelligence collection via the use of UAS within U.S. borders. 
Present-day drone operations at U.S. borders and overseas have demonstrated the powerful 
advantage gained by using aerial surveillance sensors. It is less of a question of “whether” 
an advantage is gained, but more realistically of “how” to minimize the collateral impact 
on privacy rights and civil liberties.  
Law enforcement drones significantly improve the enforcement agencies’ ability to 
counter groups and factions conducting illicit activities to harm the United States, its 
infrastructure, and its citizens. Nefarious organizations, internal and external to U.S. 
interests, are willing and able to exploit any technological advantage to achieve their goals, 
and as a nation of law-abiding citizens, U.S. citizens must stand ready to do the same. 
While inherent vulnerabilities exist in the use of UAVs, implementing reasoned control 
measures, training, and oversight when wielding UAV technology will garner support from 
the general public and allow law enforcement agencies (state, local, and federal) to 
continue to gather intelligence and counter these threats more effectively. For uses that 
may be considered riskier to constitutionally derived reasonable expectations of privacy, 
or even in cases not protected but meeting the second part of the Katz test, law enforcement 
agents can be trained to err on the side of demonstrating probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion. 
Moreover, drones offer many valuable benefits not targeted at deterring crime. In 
light of recent technological advances, state and local law enforcement agencies can and 
should employ drones in society. Public safety missions, for example search and rescue, 
on-scene traffic accident investigation, or assessing crowds in such volatile situations as 
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riots or protests all help increase the safety and security of public spaces without infringing 
on the privacy of U.S. citizens. Natural disaster response and recovery efforts are also 
significantly aided by using small UASs to locate victims, deliver supplies, and act as ad-
hoc communications networks to carry signals to remote areas or bridge non-coverage 
zones. Future programs, like the proposed “Follow Me” campus security model, or similar 
programs with drones escorting people through risky neighborhoods upon request, are 
made possible by ensuring that technology is not unnecessarily limited out of fear or 
broader political agenda. 
Thus, what comes next depends mostly on the collective wisdom and collaborative 
nature of the key players in the debate. This thesis attempts to highlight the distinction 
between surveillance technology and delivery platforms to understand how to approach 
regulating data gathering better. In doing so, this thesis examined Title III and relative 
jurisprudence dealing with both surveillance and aerial platforms to bring forward the 
salient points in crafting recommendations that support an increase in citizens’ safety and 
security but remain within the bounds of constitutional liberty and the Fourth Amendment. 
To that end, the best way to achieve that goal is to develop a framework to regulate data. 
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APPENDIX A. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, 
TECHNOLOGICAL (PEST) ANALYSIS 
POLITICAL 
· Visual surveillance is not federally regulated and is inconsistent between states (-) 
· Lack of federal regulation allows for easier implementation of programs at the local 
level (+) 
· Title 10/ 14 jurisdiction issues cloud consensus on who wields tech and shares info (-) 
‣ Concerns surrounding surveilling U.S. citizens on U.S. soil 
‣ 100-mile gray zone 
· Possibility of federal taxes used to subsidize safety surveillance program (-) 
· Standardization through regulation makes laws easier to enforce (+) 
· Regulation provides clear guidance for states to follow (+) 
· Solutions capture the possibility of future growth/innovation without additional 
expansion needed to regulations at each successive iteration (+) 
· Competitors/near peers/nefarious elements already have access to an utilize 
technological advancements to gain an advantage (-) 
· Regulation expansion can draw from existing expertise in FAA UAS implementation 
(+) 
ECONOMIC 
· Successful UAS implementation requires long term funding (-) 
‣ Technology repairs and upgrades (-) 
‣ Equipment loss (-) 
‣ Training/proficiency (-) 
‣ Tax increase or other budget tradeoff (-) 
· Small UAS systems are cheaper to obtain/own/operate than the manned equivalent 
(+) 
· Low cost Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) (+) 
‣ Wide availability 
‣ Affordable 
‣ Small benefit 
· Any additional cost to small budget districts may result in layoffs (-) 
· Technology quality is an inherent tradeoff with price point (+/-) 
‣ Higher availability/lower cost (+) 
‣ Lower quality/reliability (-) 
‣ Fewer features/less capability (-) 
· Increased cost to protect businesses with surveillance (-) 
‣ Licensing 
‣ Certification 
‣ Cooperation with information sharing requests 
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· Current economy is struggling; opportunity for new growth in market (+) 
· Wide market for tech training and research opportunities (+) 
SOCIAL 
· Drone operations are viewed as more intrusive and suspicious than physical presence 
(-) 
· Expectation of privacy tradeoff (+/-) 
‣ People are able to use technology to enhance their lives (+) 
‣ Enhancements require increasing amounts of data about people to work (-) 




‣ Actionability of data collected 
· Enhances safety of LEO and civilians entering dangerous/unknown situations (+) 
· Potential to degrade LEO skills if officers become too complacent/reliant on tech (-) 
· Tech loss of control can endanger crowds or violate airspace; safety and disruption (-) 
· Drone transit can be seen as a nuisance (-) 
· Drone delivery service increases positive public perception (+) 
· Drone presence enhances crowd control (+/-) 
‣ People less likely to escalate situations under observation (+) 
‣ Eyes on without a physical presence (+) 
‣ Better area coverage; one person can monitor many drones (+) 
‣ Slower response time; physical presence is not on-site (-) 
· People have not actively consented to being monitored/recorded (-) 
· Public currently has a negative attitude associated with NSA surveillance (-) 
· Streamline prosecution and chain of evidence (+) 
· Business may resent government interference in monitoring self (-) 
· Clientele may be affected by LEO linked surveillance in businesses (+/-) 
· U.S. is currently in a climate of unrest; non-confrontational law enhancement tool (+) 
‣ Non-intrusive increase in coverage of volatile situations 
‣ Force multiplier 
· Global presence: visual surveillance systems successfully operate throughout the 
world (+) 
‣ Similar countries 
‣ Demonstrated model for success/public acceptance 
· Boomer generation is dying, shifting the prevailing attitude towards tech-positive (+) 
‣ Current/future generations grew up with tech (+) 
‣ Privacy expectations of current/future generation tempered by desire for tech 
(+) 
‣ Current/future gen. highly educated, less susceptible to ignorance-based fear 
and misinformation (+) 
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· Large influential companies (Amazon/Walmart/UPS) embracing drones in operations 
(+) 
‣ Drone use associated with positive connotations 
ß Mail delivery/medical supplies  
ß Wedding and event videography  
ß Food delivery 
‣ Increases public comfort levels and acceptance of drone operations 
· Large market shift toward autonomy (+) 
‣ Drone-assisted retail 
‣ Unmanned vehicles 
‣ Car autopilot assist 
‣ Camera-intensive applications 
· Media/propaganda less likely to drive agendas; independent verification dispels spin 
(+) 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
· New technology is inherently more capable, giving users an increased advantage over 
unassisted methods and/or previous generations of similar technology (+) 
· Increases in technology generally produce faster results or increase efficiency (+) 
· Drone-based visual surveillance allows a physical standoff from potentially 
dangerous or unstable situations without losing situational awareness (+) 
· Drone sensors can record on the fly, creating a reliable and unbiased record of events 
(+) 
· Provide access beyond human capability in difficult terrain/extreme conditions (+) 
‣ Deliver supplies (+) 
‣ Assess conditions (+) 
‣ Establish remote communications (+) 
· Drone/tech subject to loss of control (-) 
‣ Spoofing 
‣ Insufficient training 
‣ Tech failure 
· Identification via algorithm not currently reliable/ demonstrates a programmer bias (-) 
· False positive identification possible due to system limitations/degradation (-) 
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APPENDIX B. PEST ANALYSIS RESULTS—STAKEHOLDER 
PREFERENCE AND FEASIBILITY TABLES 
Table 1. Pest Feasibility Chart 



















Determines which option predominates in each category to make a clear recommendation 
Table 2. Stakeholder Preference 
OPTIONS      
Regulation 
before Collection + - - + + 
Regulation after 










Determines the stakeholder preference; prioritizes the recommendation. 
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